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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
Katherine Mims Crocker* 
A range of scholars has subjected qualified immunity to a wave of criticism—
and for good reasons. But the Supreme Court continues to apply the doctrine 
in ever more aggressive ways. By advancing two claims, this Article seeks to 
make some sense of this conflict and to suggest some thoughts toward a reso-
lution. 
First, while the Court has offered and scholars have rejected several ration-
ales for the doctrine, layering in an account grounded in structural constitu-
tional concerns provides a historically richer and analytically thicker 
understanding of the current qualified-immunity regime. For suits against 
federal officials, qualified immunity acts as a “compensating adjustment” to 
the separation-of-powers error ostensibly underlying the Court’s decision to 
allow such suits without congressional approval. For suits against state offi-
cials, qualified immunity addresses federalism concerns by leveling the field 
for constitutional enforcement so that state defendants do not face harsher 
penalties than their federal counterparts do. 
Second, while this structural account situates the doctrine within powerful 
constitutional currents, it does not justify the current qualified-immunity re-
gime. For suits against federal officials, the structural account articulates a 
poor compensating adjustment because qualified immunity supplies an 
awkward solution to any separation-of-powers problem. For suits against 
state officials, the structural account appears to rest on a notion of “free-
standing federalism” that is too far removed from the actual constitutional 
design. 
Alongside prior scholarship, and for different reasons for suits against federal 
and state officials, this analysis leaves the present model of qualified immuni-
ty ripe for rejection or replacement with a more rights-protective alternative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Qualified immunity, which provides a defense for executive-branch offi-
cials in damages lawsuits alleging the violation of constitutional rights, has 
enjoyed a prominent spot on the Supreme Court’s docket for over thirty 
years. In 1982, the Court articulated the current form of qualified immunity 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,1 holding that “government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages” 
 
 1. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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in constitutional-tort suits “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”2 
Since then, the Court has repeatedly expanded the protections afforded by 
the doctrine in new and more muscular ways. Over the same period, howev-
er, scholars have done a great deal to undermine the reasons that the justices 
have offered for adopting the current qualified-immunity regime, and much 
of the legal community more broadly has come out against it. 
Why has the Court “doubl[ed] down” on a doctrine that has been the 
subject of so much criticism?3 By focusing on the justices’ stated rationales, 
critics have largely overlooked an account of qualified immunity rooted in 
constitutional structure and, specifically, in certain separation-of-powers 
and federalism concerns. This structural account is important because it of-
fers a historically richer and analytically thicker view of the doctrine’s devel-
opment. But on close examination, the considerations underlying this 
account provide no compelling justification for the defense, leaving the pre-
sent model of qualified immunity ripe for replacement or, indeed, rejection. 
But why does qualified immunity matter? Among other reasons, because 
it excuses conduct that seems inexcusable. Consider Kisela v. Hughes,4 one of 
the Supreme Court’s latest qualified-immunity decisions. A police officer 
shot a woman four times while she was standing outside her home about six 
feet from her roommate.5 To be sure, the woman was holding a kitchen knife 
at her side, and the police had received a report that a woman had been us-
ing a kitchen knife to hack a tree.6 But the woman was calm when the police 
confronted her, and the officer who gunned her down gave her no warning.7 
The Court granted qualified immunity.8 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor said 
that the majority’s opinion “tells officers that they can shoot first and think 
later” and “tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go un-
punished.”9 One could say the same thing about White v. Pauly,10 a 2017 Su-
preme Court decision vacating the denial of qualified immunity where a 
police officer shot and killed a man inside his home without sufficient warn-
ing11—or about Mullenix v. Luna,12 a 2015 Supreme Court decision revers-
ing the denial of qualified immunity where an officer fatally shot the driver 
 
 2. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 3. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 87 (2018). 
 4. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). 
 5. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1151–52. 
 9. Id. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 10. 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017). 
 11. White, 137 S. Ct. at 549–51. 
 12. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). 
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of a fleeing vehicle from a highway overpass in defiance of direct orders and 
then asked, “[h]ow’s that for proactive?”13 
These examples are all drawn from the Supreme Court’s recent docket, 
but the facts of some lower-court cases are even more egregious. In one case, 
police officers—again without warning—lowered a dog over a wall and into 
the backyard of a mobile home while pursuing a robbery suspect.14 The dog 
bit the mobile-home resident, who was eighty-nine years old.15 The wound 
became infected; the man’s leg had to be amputated; and he died the next 
month.16 The court granted qualified immunity.17 In another case, police of-
ficers tied a man that they had arrested on a traffic warrant to a metal pole in 
a deserted parking lot in the middle of the night and drove away, leaving him 
alone for about ten minutes until officers from another department picked 
him up.18 The defendants claimed that they had been playing a prank.19 The 
court excoriated them for “Keystone Kop activity that degrades those subject 
to detention and that lacks any conceivable law enforcement purpose.”20 But 
it nevertheless granted qualified immunity.21 
Qualified immunity shields many kinds of government officials, not just 
police officers. In one Supreme Court case, for instance, several middle-
school employees benefited from the doctrine after strip-searching a thir-
teen-year-old girl suspected of providing prescription-strength ibuprofen 
and a nonprescription painkiller to classmates.22 Indeed, there is “no reliable 
way to know how often zoning officials, welfare bureaucrats, or prison 
guards act on unconstitutional grounds or discard mandatory procedures.”23 
Nevertheless, constitutional violations have become “routinized in some 
urban neighborhoods.”24 And qualified immunity has become a prominent 
part of the national conversation surrounding law-enforcement conduct and 
racial injustice in the wake of recent events, especially police shootings of 
 
 13. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 306–08; id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Luna v. 
Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2014)). Indeed, Sotomayor argued that the majority 
“sanction[ed] a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach” here as well. Id. at 316. 
 14. McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2013). This case is 
discussed in Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 67–70 (2017). 
 15. McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 975. 
 16. Id. at 975–76. 
 17. Id. at 984–85. 
 18. Robles v. Prince George’s County, 302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2002). This case is dis-
cussed in John F. Preis, Qualified Immunity and Fault, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1969, 1974–76 
(2018). 
 19. Robles, 302 F.3d at 266. 
 20. Id. at 271. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–79 (2009). 
 23. Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 
DUKE L.J. 1, 3–4 (2015). 
 24. Id. at 3. 
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unarmed black men.25 Many believe that “[t]he acquittal” recently “of anoth-
er Baltimore police officer charged in the death of Freddie Gray, like the ac-
quittal 25 years ago of the Los Angeles officers who beat Rodney King, 
reveals the inadequacy of the criminal-law remedy” in an acute way.26 And 
scholars and advocacy organizations ranging from the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund to the Cato Institute have urged a reevaluation 
of doctrines like qualified immunity that allow law-enforcement officers who 
misuse their power to evade civil accountability.27 
Qualified immunity, of course, matters not only to plaintiffs and others 
concerned with protecting constitutional rights, but also to defendants and 
others concerned with curbing spurious suits against public servants. To 
quote Harlow, and as explored in more detail below, “claims frequently run 
against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant 
officials, but to society as a whole.”28 Qualified immunity, the thinking goes, 
helps ease such burdens where they are relatively unlikely to be cost justified. 
So why does an account of qualified immunity rooted in constitutional 
structure matter? Consider the state of the debate. As expounded below, 
much of the legal community disapproves of qualified immunity,29 but the 
Supreme Court continues to enhance its scope and strength.30 Scholars at-
 
 25. See Eugene Scott, Supreme Court Justice Affirms Activists’ Fears That Police Can 
‘Shoot First and Think Later,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/03/supreme-court-justice-affirms-activists-fears-that-police-
can-shoot-first-and-think-later/ [https://perma.cc/Y522-SZT6]. 
 26. Jon O. Newman, Opinion, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for 
Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-
better-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-
d6005beac8b3_story.html [https://perma.cc/VS4X-HNR5]. 
 27. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil 
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 911 (2016) (reviewing SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015)); LDF Statement on 
the Non-Indictment of Cleveland Police Officers in the Shooting Death of Tamir Rice, LDF (Dec. 
28, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-statement-on-the-non-indictment-of-
cleveland-police-officers-in-the-shooting-death-of-tamir-rice [https://perma.cc/8STA-EN3A]; 
Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police Account-
ability, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-immunity-supreme-courts-
unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability [https://perma.cc/AYC7-7KQ5]. 
 28. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see infra Section I.A. 
 29. See Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Qualified Immunity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2018) (“The critics and critiques of qualified immunity . . . 
are by now legion . . . . [T]he chorus of dissent from the doctrine is growing louder of late.”); 
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 
87, 89 (1999) (“In today’s constitutional landscape, the largest, most lamented, and least de-
fended gap between right and remedy involves money damages.”); infra Section I.B. 
 30. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 64 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s qualified immunity opin-
ions . . . have made a sub silentio assault on constitutional tort suits. In a number of recent rul-
ings, the Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly broadening the defense . . . .”); Schwartz, 
supra note 14, at 6 (stating that the Court “appears to be on a mission to curb civil rights law-
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tack the defense on multiple grounds. Several argue that it is unjust, unclear, 
unfair to disfavored populations, or dependent on assumptions that defy re-
ality. And recent commentary contends that it lacks the historical support 
necessary to qualify as a background legal principle, represents a poor analo-
gy to the rule of lenity, and fails to rectify the effects of a purported error in 
precedent that some say provides it cover. 
Many prior attacks on qualified immunity focus on rationales that 
members of the Supreme Court themselves have given. And many of these 
attacks are compelling. But the judges and commentators who continue to 
support the doctrine have evidently found them unconvincing or incom-
plete. Additional accounts of where qualified immunity comes from and why 
it persists, therefore, may offer both sides of the debate a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the problem. One such account turns on constitution-
al structure and comprises two lines of logic. The first relates to suits against 
federal officials, and the second relates to suits against state officials. Ulti-
mately, neither legitimates qualified immunity, but each fails for different 
reasons. 
The starting point is that Harlow arose under the Supreme Court’s 1971 
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,31 which established an implied cause of action against federal offi-
cials for violating federal constitutional rights.32 When Harlow was decided, 
the Bivens regime was facing increasing hostility for separation-of-powers 
reasons, with several justices arguing that the judiciary should not allow 
damages suits without congressional approval. The historical context thus 
suggests that Harlow offered an indirect opportunity to restrain the Bivens 
regime by strengthening qualified immunity, and a range of evidence sug-
gests that the Court did just that. Consequently, separation-of-powers con-
cerns appear to provide qualified immunity an important source of support 
in the Bivens context. 
The Court next addressed whether the Harlow standard should apply 
beyond Bivens actions to suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which pro-
vides an express cause of action against state officials for violating federal 
constitutional or statutory rights.33 The Court answered in the affirmative, 
explaining that applying different standards to federal and state defendants 
 
suits against law enforcement officers, and appears to believe qualified immunity is the means 
of achieving its goal”); see also infra Section I.A. 
 31. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 32. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). Section 1983 provides a cause of action against both 
state and local-government officials. For the sake of simplicity, however, I usually refer to the 
former only. 
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would have been untenable. The reasoning behind this move suggests that 
federalism concerns provide qualified immunity an important source of 
support in the § 1983 context. 
This structural account situates the doctrine’s development within pow-
erful currents of constitutional jurisprudence. But it does not justify the cur-
rent qualified-immunity regime. The separation-of-powers strand regards 
qualified immunity as a judge-made solution to a judge-made problem—that 
is, as a “compensating adjustment” to the judicial overreach ostensibly un-
derlying Bivens actions. But those who support the Bivens paradigm would 
probably reject the premise that a problem exists in the first place. And those 
who oppose it should be troubled by qualified immunity for the same reason 
that they are troubled by implied constitutional causes of action: both in-
quiries allow the judiciary to make arguably legislative determinations about 
which constitutional-tort suits should proceed. The separation-of-powers 
aspect of the structural account advanced here thus fails to provide qualified 
immunity a persuasive justification. 
More difficult to see is the theoretical basis underlying the federalism 
strand of the structural account—other than an intuitive belief that the law 
should treat state and federal officials the same way. As a thought experi-
ment, though, at least three rationales seem possible: one arising from an 
equal-sovereignty principle, one from the incorporation doctrine associated 
with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one from the congru-
ence-and-proportionality concept associated with Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. These theories do not withstand scrutiny as requiring 
equivalent qualified-immunity standards for state and federal officials. Sec-
tion 1983 does not seem to infringe state sovereignty in any way that would 
offend an equal-sovereignty principle. And among other shortcomings, any 
imperative stemming from Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should apply to all § 1983 suits concerning the Bill of Rights, but qualified 
immunity applies only to damages claims against executive officials for dis-
cretionary actions. Accordingly, although federal–state parallelism in consti-
tutional enforcement warrants additional attention, no particular legal 
principle appears to offer sufficient support for applying the Harlow stand-
ard to § 1983 suits on the federalism grounds identified in this analysis. In-
stead, this aspect of the structural account advanced here appears to rest on a 
notion of “freestanding federalism” that is too far removed from the actual 
constitutional design. 
Of note, the term “qualified immunity” here generally refers to the Har-
low standard except where the context indicates otherwise, notwithstanding 
the fact that the moniker predates the model. The discussion proceeds as fol-
lows. Part I provides an overview of Harlow and other key doctrinal devel-
opments and then surveys previous academic evaluations of qualified 
immunity. Part II explores the import of the Bivens backdrop to the Harlow 
standard’s emergence and excavates the separation-of-powers line of logic 
from Supreme Court opinions. Part III recounts the Harlow standard’s ex-
pansion from the Bivens environment into the § 1983 sphere and uncovers 
the federalism line of logic. Part IV offers a normative assessment of the 
1412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1405 
structural account of qualified immunity advanced here, ultimately contend-
ing that a sufficient justification for the doctrine remains elusive. This analy-
sis thus bolsters the calls of critics across the legal community to reject 
qualified immunity—or at least to replace it with a more sensible, and more 
rights-protective, alternative. 
I. HASHING OVER THE HARLOW STANDARD 
This Part provides a primer on the Supreme Court’s constitutional-tort 
immunity jurisprudence, including the decisions that paved the way for Har-
low and those that have subsequently expanded the protections afforded by 
qualified immunity. The Part proceeds to consider academic evaluations of 
the Harlow standard, including several that undermine the reasons offered 
by the justices for constructing such a government-protective system. 
A. Doctrinal Overview 
Qualified immunity is widely viewed as “the most important doctrine in 
the law of constitutional torts.”34 The Harlow standard provides that “gov-
ernment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”35 Explaining that the doctrine represents “an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” the Supreme 
Court has made clear that the protection “is effectively lost if a case is erro-
neously permitted to go to trial.”36 
The story behind Harlow begins in important ways with Pierson v. Ray,37 
a 1967 Supreme Court decision stemming from the arrest of several Freedom 
Riders for gathering at a Mississippi bus terminal. Pierson said that § 1983 
“should be read against the background of tort liability.”38 And in the con-
text of “police officers making an arrest,” the Court said, the background of 
tort liability included “the defense of good faith and probable cause.”39 
Pierson thus adopted a tort-specific concept of a historical common-law de-
 
 34. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 
852 (2010). 
 35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 36. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985). With respect to damages suits, abso-
lute immunity generally shields officials from claims based on legislative, judicial, and some 
prosecutorial functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (prosecutorial func-
tions); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (judicial functions); Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (legislative functions). It also protects the president with respect to 
official acts. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). And sovereign immunity gener-
ally safeguards state and federal entities, as well as individuals sued in their official capacities. 
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985). 
 37. 386 U.S. 547. 
 38. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 362 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). 
 39. Id. at 557. 
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fense. But seven years later in Scheuer v. Rhodes,40 which arose from the 1970 
shooting of students at Kent State University by the Ohio National Guard, 
the Court extended the good-faith defense beyond the arrest context to suits 
involving state-level executive action at large.41 Then, in Butz v. Economou,42 
a 1978 case involving claims against defendants affiliated with the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, the Court further extended the defense to suits 
against federal officials under Bivens. 43 
Harlow followed in 1982. The flagship section of Justice Powell’s majori-
ty opinion begins by declaring that “[t]he resolution of immunity questions 
inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available al-
ternative.”44 On the one hand, the Court said, “an action for damages may 
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”45 
But on the other, “claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a 
whole.”46 These “social costs,” the Court remarked, “include the expenses of 
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the 
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”47 Another cost, 
the Court said, “is the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.’ ”48 
The Court proceeded to consider whether to make “an adjustment of the 
‘good faith’ standard” established by prior decisions.49 It had become clear, 
the Court said, that “substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective 
good faith of government officials.”50 In addition to “the general costs of 
subjecting officials to the risks of trial,” the Court cited “special costs to ‘sub-
jective’ inquiries of this kind,” like “broad-ranging discovery and the depos-
ing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues.”51 
These inquiries, the Court said, “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective 
government.”52 
The Court thus concluded that “bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the 
 
 40. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
 41. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237. 
 42. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 43. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507. 
 44. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 814. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 
1949)). 
 49. Id. at 814–15. 
 50. Id. at 816. 
 51. Id. at 816–17. 
 52. Id. at 817. 
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burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”53 Instead, the Court held that “gov-
ernment officials performing discretionary functions” generally should not 
face damages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”54 This “objective” inquiry, the Court made clear, did not re-
quire subjective good faith on the part of defendants.55 
The Harlow standard has remained the analytical reference point for ap-
plying qualified immunity. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly expanded 
the doctrine’s protections in new and more muscular ways. 
One could catalogue multiple substantive examples. For instance, the 
Court has subtly lowered the bar for benefiting from the defense by shifting 
the standard for denying qualified immunity from whether “a” reasonable 
person would have known of the right in question to whether “every” rea-
sonable person would have known of the right in question.56 And the Court 
has repeatedly stated that the doctrine shields “all but the plainly incompe-
tent or those who knowingly violate the law.”57 What is more, the Court has 
required lower courts to ask whether rights were clearly established at a very 
low level of generality,58 such that “the clearly-established-law standard of 
Harlow is fact-specific and qualified immunity is correspondingly broad.”59 
And the Court has strictly limited the sources of law that can render a right 
clearly established, making qualified immunity increasingly easy to obtain.60 
The Court has also accorded qualified immunity a privileged position in 
the law’s procedural scaffolding. It has held, for instance, that federal-court 
defendants may immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity when the 
defense fails on the ground that the right in question was clearly estab-
lished.61 And the Court has taken up and overturned lower-court decisions 
concerning qualified immunity with a frequency and consistency of out-
 
 53. Id. at 817–18. 
 54. Id. at 818. 
 55. See id. at 818–19. 
 56. Kinports, supra note 30, at 65. 
 57. This statement appears in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018), and District 
of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018), but those are just two of the most recent ex-
amples. It first appeared in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 58. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987) (“[I]f the test of ‘clear-
ly established law’ were to be applied at [a high] level of generality, it would bear no relation-
ship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of vir-
tually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”). 
 59. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ 
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 82 (1999). 
 60. See Kinports, supra note 30, at 69–72. 
 61. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985). By contrast, defendants may 
not immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity that are based on the conclusion that 
“the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.” 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995). 
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come—in favor of the defendant government officials—seen in few other ar-
eas of law.62 Over the last decade, moreover, the Court has often done so 
through the relatively rare and especially assertive mechanism of summary 
reversal, which without merits briefing or oral argument condemns lower-
court rulings as incorrect.63 
At bottom, the Supreme Court “is not just maintaining the doctrine of 
qualified immunity as a matter of precedent.”64 Instead, the justices are 
“doubling down” on the doctrine by “enforcing it aggressively against lower 
courts.”65 
B. Academic Evaluations 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s fondness for qualified immunity, 
Harlow and its offspring have experienced an increasingly hostile reception 
in the academy. Indeed, the rules surrounding qualified immunity have 
“been roundly criticized as incoherent, illogical, and overly protective of 
government officials who act unconstitutionally and in bad faith.”66 
One idea is that qualified immunity contravenes the moral ideal of “cor-
rective justice,” which has been called “the most persuasive nondeterrence 
justification for awarding tort damages to victims of government unconstitu-
tionality.”67 Typified by Erwin Chemerinsky’s commentary, this criticism 
asserts that the doctrine is insufficiently protective of basic freedoms.68 Un-
der this view, qualified immunity inappropriately allows officials who violate 
constitutional rights to duck judicial consequences and diminishes individu-
al dignity, governmental accountability, and societal faith in systems of pow-
er.69 
Other evaluations disparage the doctrine as difficult to decipher.70 As 
one judge puts it: “Wading through the doctrine of qualified immunity is 
 
 62. See Baude, supra note 3, at 82 (“In the thirty-five years since it announced the objec-
tive-reasonableness standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified 
immunity cases. Only twice has the Court actually found official conduct to violate clearly es-
tablished law. Those two findings, in Groh v. Ramirez and Hope v. Pelzer, occurred more than a 
decade ago.” (footnote omitted)). 
 63. See id. at 85–88. 
 64. Id. at 87. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 11. 
 67. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on 
the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 93–96 (1989). 
 68. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-
court-protects-bad-cops.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 69. See id. For a somewhat related argument that qualified immunity “does not properly 
assess fault because it immunizes persons who are at fault and holds liable persons who are 
not,” see Preis, supra note 18, at 1971–72. 
 70. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 34, at 852 (“[D]etermining whether an officer violated 
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion.”); Chaim 
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one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate 
court judges routinely face.”71 
Taking a different tack, some scholars have approached qualified im-
munity from what one could characterize as a functionalist perspective. Ex-
emplified by Richard Fallon and Daryl Levinson, these theorists argue that 
simplistic criticisms of the right–remedy gap ignore the realities of actual ad-
judication.72 “[R]ights and remedies are inextricably intertwined,” they con-
tend, in that “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their 
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very exist-
ence.”73 
Aziz Huq’s functionalist critique argues that the Supreme Court devised 
fault rules like the Harlow standard “as a result of the judiciary’s institutional 
interests in prestige and docket management.”74 Because these rules incline 
courts away from addressing the kind of routine and fact-intensive conduct 
that makes up many constitutional wrongs, Huq contends that “the Court 
has rendered most difficult to remedy” those injuries that represent “the 
lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence” and that affect “many of 
the least politically powerful communities” in the nation.75 
Other lines of inquiry examine the arguments that members of the Su-
preme Court themselves have advanced for qualified immunity. One line cri-
tiques rationales rooted in policy, and another critiques rationales rooted in 
positive law. 
Joanna Schwartz has led the charge against the Court’s policy rationales 
with two empirical studies. The first revolves around the “frequently repeat-
ed” contention that qualified immunity “protects government officials” as 
individuals “from the burdens of financial liability.”76 Schwartz’s research 
challenges this assumption by suggesting that “[p]olice officers are virtually 
always indemnified” by state and local governments and “are also almost al-
ways provided with defense counsel free of charge.”77 This holds true, 
Schwartz says, even when indemnification is “prohibited by statute or poli-
cy” and when defendants are “disciplined or terminated by the department 
or criminally prosecuted for their conduct.”78 She therefore concludes that 
 
Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155–56 (2005) (“Despite the al-
most annual ritual of doctrinal clarification, the federal reporters are crammed with dissents 
and en banc decisions taking issue over the proper scope and role of qualified immunity.”). 
 71. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the 
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000). 
 72. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2011); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equili-
bration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999). 
 73. Levinson, supra note 72, at 858. 
 74. Huq, supra note 23, at 9–10. 
 75. Id. at 70–74. 
 76. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 59. 
 77. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890, 915 (2014). 
 78. Id. at 890. 
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“qualified immunity can no longer be justified as a means of protecting of-
ficers from the financial burdens of personal liability.”79 
Schwartz’s second study challenges another hypothesis underlying the 
Supreme Court’s embrace of the Harlow standard. As Schwartz explains, the 
Court “has described ‘the “driving force” behind’ ” qualified-immunity doc-
trine as “resolving ‘ “insubstantial claims” against government offi-
cials . . . prior to discovery.’ ”80 But according to her analysis of § 1983 suits 
against law-enforcement officers in certain jurisdictions, just 0.6% of cases 
were dismissed because of qualified immunity before discovery, and just 
3.2%, before trial.81 She therefore concludes that “qualified immunity doc-
trine infrequently plays its intended role in the litigation of constitutional 
claims against law enforcement.”82 
While Schwartz has focused on the Court’s policy rationales, William 
Baude has focused on positive law by examining three “technical legal justifi-
cation[s]” that the Court has offered for qualified immunity.83 The first and 
“most widely known theory,” Baude writes, argues that “the immunity is a 
common-law backdrop that could be read into” § 1983 under familiar tenets 
of statutory interpretation.84 Echoing others,85 Baude argues that several his-
torical problems plague this theory.86 For one, there was no “general immun-
ity” at common law.87 Accordingly, “there was no well-established, good-
faith defense in suits about constitutional violations when Section 1983 was 
enacted, nor in Section 1983 suits early after its enactment.”88 And recent 
immunity jurisprudence has “distorted” any common-law connection in 
multiple ways.89 Harlow, for instance, consciously broke from the good-faith 
framework of Pierson and its progeny.90 And more broadly, the doctrine has 
become “increasingly protective” of defendants.91 
A second justification is what Baude calls the “lenity theory” of qualified 
immunity.92 Around the time that it enacted § 1983, Congress passed a crim-
 
 79. Id. at 939. 
 80. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 60 (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 76. 
 83. Baude, supra note 3, at 46. 
 84. Id. at 52; see, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383–84 (2012). 
 85. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental 
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (1972). 
 86. Baude, supra note 3, at 55–61. 
 87. Id. at 55. Instead, a defense premised on the defendant’s good faith arose as “part of 
the elements of” certain torts. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 60–61. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 61; see supra Section I.A. 
 92. Baude, supra note 3, at 69–77. 
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inal statute, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, that penalized government offi-
cials for violating federal constitutional or statutory rights. To provide “fair 
warning” and avoid vagueness problems, the Supreme Court has long ap-
plied a narrowing construction to § 242 by requiring “a specific intent to de-
prive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of 
law.”93 The Court has on occasion explicitly analogized qualified immunity 
to this lenity-related rule,94 and certain aspects of the doctrine may implicitly 
do the same.95 Baude, however, identifies multiple problems with this theory 
too. First, lenity is usually restricted to criminal-law contexts.96 Second, 
§ 1983 offers no textual hook for a lenient approach (unlike § 242, which 
punishes only rights violations committed “willfully”).97 And third, qualified 
immunity “has come to bear little practical resemblance to the rules applica-
ble to criminal defendants.”98 In particular, although the Court “has explicit-
ly rejected the relevance of circuit splits to the lenity inquiry,”99 judicial 
discord all but answers the qualified-immunity question in the affirmative.100 
Baude locates a third justification for the Harlow standard in a dissent-
ing opinion by Justice Scalia. In Crawford-El v. Britton,101 Scalia admitted 
that “our treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not 
purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when 
§ 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to sub-
sume.”102 But “[t]hat is perhaps just as well,” Scalia said, because the Court 
had erroneously expanded liability under § 1983 beyond what the text could 
bear.103 As Scalia put it, in Monroe v. Pape,104 the Court had 
 
 93. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103–05 (1945) (plurality opinion). 
 94. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 
(1997); see also Baude, supra note 3, at 71–72. 
 95. For example, the refrain that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all 
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” which the Court first 
stated in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), calls to mind “criminal recklessness or de-
liberate wrongdoing,” Baude, supra note 3, at 72. For an extended analysis likening qualified 
immunity to fair notice in the criminal-law context, see Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Im-
munity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998). 
 96. According to Baude, the Court generally invokes lenity in civil-law settings only 
where the same statutory language applies in a criminal-law setting as well. See Baude, supra 
note 3, at 72–73 (first citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–
18 (1992) (plurality opinion); then citing id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring); then citing Crandon 
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); and then citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 
(2004)). 
 97. Id. at 73 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012)). 
 98. Id. at 74. 
 99. Id. at 74–75 (emphasis omitted) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 
(1990), and United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984)). 
 100. See id. at 75. 
 101. 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
 102. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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converted an 1871 statute covering constitutional violations committed 
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any 
State,” into a statute covering constitutional violations committed without 
the authority of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any 
State, and indeed even constitutional violations committed in stark viola-
tion of state civil or criminal law.105 
Baude finds issues with this reasoning as well. First, he says, Monroe was 
probably right. Among other things, he argues that “under color of [law]” is 
a historical term of art that includes “false claims of legal authority” and that 
aspects of § 1983’s drafting history suggest that the statute carries this mean-
ing.106 Second, even if one grants Scalia’s premise, Baude says, “the results 
ought to be nothing like the modern regime of qualified immunity.”107 In-
stead, they ought to be like the system envisioned by Justice Frankfurter in 
his Monroe dissent, such that federal liability attaches only when the state 
fails to remedy the wrong.108 But qualified immunity under Harlow “comes 
closer to tracking state common law than . . . to filling in state law’s gaps.”109 
Taken together, the arguments outlined above significantly undermine 
the case for qualified immunity, especially with respect to the justices’ own 
accounts of their reasoning. But these arguments have not gained universal 
acceptance in the academic community. A recent essay by Aaron Nielson 
and Christopher Walker, for instance, attempts to poke holes in Baude’s and 
Schwartz’s work.110 As Nielson and Walker point out, the conclusion of 
Schwartz’s second study (concerning the rejection of § 1983 suits early in the 
litigation process) seems especially susceptible to skepticism because of some 
debatable design decisions.111 The study, for example, counts a case “as dis-
missed on qualified immunity grounds only if the entire case has been dis-
missed as a result of the motion.”112 So it does not include cases where the 
court granted leave to amend the complaint, where some but not all individ-
ual defendants moved for qualified immunity, where an individual defend-
ant moved for qualified immunity on some but not all claims, or where there 
was a municipal defendant.113 
 
 105. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012)). 
 106. Baude, supra note 3, at 63–65 (citing Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color 
of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325, 344 (1992), and David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of 
Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 4 n.13, 5 n.18, 22 n.151, 59–60). 
 107. Id. at 66. 
 108. Id. at 66–69; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202–59 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting in part). 
 109. Baude, supra note 3, at 68. 
 110. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immun-
ity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853 (2018). 
 111. See id. at 1879. 
 112. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 42. 
 113. Id. at 42–43. 
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Nevertheless, arguments defending the current qualified-immunity re-
gime often include considerable caveats. Nielson and Walker offer only a 
“qualified defense” of qualified immunity, recognizing that the doctrine “is 
by no means perfect.”114 And although Nielson and Walker’s primary con-
cern is largely procedural,115 other academic advocates of qualified immunity 
acknowledge more substantive shortcomings. 
John Jeffries provides a prominent example. Jeffries endorses incorpo-
rating fault-based conditions into constitutional adjudication through quali-
fied immunity and related doctrines.116 He contends that “the curtailment of 
damages liability for constitutional violations has deep structural advantages 
for American constitutionalism” in two ways.117 First, it “fosters the devel-
opment of constitutional law” through “facilitat[ing] constitutional change 
by reducing the costs of innovation.”118 The argument here is that judges 
would hesitate to expand constitutional rights if doing so regularly entailed 
imposing damages on government defendants.119 Second, making damages 
less available “biases constitutional remedies in favor of the future.”120 The 
argument here is that limiting retrospective monetary relief allows courts to 
focus on preventing future harms by awarding injunctive and declaratory 
remedies.121 
Notwithstanding his general support for qualified immunity, Jeffries 
admits that there are serious flaws in multiple aspects of the doctrine. These 
include “the level of generality” at which to assess whether a right is “clearly 
established”; “the question of which courts count in” making that assess-
ment; and “a dysfunctional interaction between the law of qualified immuni-
ty, as currently stated, and the content of certain constitutional rights.”122 In 
 
 114. Nielson & Walker, supra note 110, at 1854. 
 115. Nielson and Walker’s criticism of qualified immunity revolves around Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), which overruled Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), in allow-
ing courts to exercise discretion to hold that an asserted constitutional violation did not con-
travene clearly established law without addressing whether a constitutional violation actually 
occurred under the facts as alleged or adduced. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Empirical analysis, 
they argue, shows that Pearson may produce “geographic distortions in the development of 
constitutional law” and may push such development toward the ideological views of the judges 
most likely to decide unnecessary constitutional questions. Nielson & Walker, supra note 110, 
at 1884 (quoting Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015)). 
 116. See Jeffries, supra note 29, at 90. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 98–105. 
 120. Id. at 90. 
 121. Id. at 105–10. Jeffries acknowledges, however, that if courts frequently exercise the 
discretion afforded by Pearson, see supra note 115, “development of the law would be fore-
stalled by repeated applications of qualified immunity.” John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order 
of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120. 
 122. Jeffries, supra note 34, at 854–66. 
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short, Jeffries concludes, qualified immunity offers an “extravagant” level of 
protection to government officials.123 
A classic article by Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer expresses a similar 
half measure of support for qualified immunity. The article argues that as 
long as there exists “a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate 
to keep government within the bounds of law,” the availability of liability 
turning on novel legal developments ought to be analyzed under a frame-
work that “sometimes tolerates situations in which individual victims receive 
no effective redress.”124 The Harlow regime, the argument continues, fits 
comfortably within such a framework.125 Nevertheless, the article calls offi-
cial-immunity principles “troublesome” and says that they “restrict the avail-
ability of effective individual redress for constitutional violations far more” 
than Fallon and Meltzer would have liked.126 
Whatever one’s position, the point is that an important conflict under-
lies the conversation surrounding qualified immunity. On the one hand, the 
doctrine not only survives, but also thrives under the Supreme Court’s con-
tinuing cultivation. On the other, a significant segment of the legal commu-
nity stands opposed, and scholars have done much to undermine the 
justices’ stated reasons for embracing the doctrine. Indeed, the Court knows 
about Baude’s recent work, but most of its members apparently remain 
committed to the same course as before.127 There is thus reason to believe 
that qualified immunity rests on something more than the justices’ own ac-
counts disclose—and that uncovering and confronting other bases for the 
doctrine may prove useful in seeking steps forward. 
II. BRINGING IN THE BIVENS BACKGROUND 
Critiques of qualified immunity tend to overlook or underrate some-
thing important. Consider Baude’s article. The central concern relates to the 
 
 123. Jeffries, supra note 29, at 91. 
 124. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991). 
 125. Id. at 1821 (“Although individual redress is sacrificed under the Harlow immunity 
standard, other remedies, such as injunctions and the exclusion of evidence obtained through 
police misconduct, remain available to maintain a judicial check against government lawless-
ness.”). 
 126. Id. at 1738. 
 127. Justice Sotomayor cited Baude’s article on qualified immunity in her Kisela dissent. 
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). And Justice Thomas 
cited it in a separate opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment), where he surprised observers by indicating an 
openness to doing away with qualified immunity, see, e.g., Perry Grossman, Clarence Thomas 
to the Rescue?, SLATE (June 21, 2017, 1:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/06/in_ziglar_v_abbasi_clarence_thomas_signals_his_s
upport_for_civil_rights.html [https://perma.cc/MQH6-SJC7]. Noting that the parties had not 
asked the Court to reconsider the doctrine in Abbasi, Thomas urged his colleagues to do so 
“[i]n an appropriate case.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). 
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Harlow standard’s validity vis-à-vis a proper interpretation of § 1983. As a 
formal matter, however, Harlow had nothing to do with § 1983. The plaintiff 
sued two senior aides to President Nixon for eliminating his position with 
the Air Force in retaliation for congressional testimony protected by the First 
Amendment, so the constitutional claim arose under Bivens.128 Indeed, ob-
servers often regard the Bivens aspect of Harlow’s heritage as mere historical 
happenstance.129 But as this Part argues, Supreme Court opinions suggest 
that the Bivens context supplied Harlow both a methodological margin and a 
structural rationale, with the latter resting on deeply held separation-of-
powers concerns. 
A. Previous Understandings 
Judges and others have sometimes noted that the origin of qualified 
immunity in a Bivens case might bear on its operation or legitimacy in the 
§ 1983 context. The inquiry, however, has usually stopped short of exploring 
the issue in an extended way. In one dissent, for example, Justice Scalia re-
marked that Harlow and another qualified-immunity decision were “techni-
cally distinguishable” from the case at bar “in that they involved not the stat-
statutory cause of action against state officials created by Congress in § 1983, 
but the cause of action against federal officials inferred from the Constitu-
tion by this Court in Bivens.”130 But, Scalia said, Harlow and the other deci-
sion “made nothing of that distinction, citing § 1983 cases in support of their 
holdings.”131 He therefore dropped the issue. 
Indeed, the literature exhibits a widespread assumption that Harlow re-
sponded to perceived problems with constitutional-tort litigation in general 
rather than with the Bivens regime in particular. Under this view, qualified 
immunity took root in a Bivens action instead of a § 1983 suit largely by 
“happenstance and accident.”132 The most nuanced version of this view per-
mits the possibility that the Bivens context, as an area grounded in federal 
common law, supplied the methodological freedom necessary for Harlow to 
loosen the chains of statutory interpretation that had shackled qualified im-
munity to historical defenses in the § 1983 context.133 Proponents of this 
 
 128. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802–05 (1982); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 731, 733–39 (1982). 
 129. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 3, at 50 n.14 (stating that “one might imagine that [the 
Bivens cause of action] would have produced distinct questions of unwritten immunity” but 
that “so far, the [Supreme] Court has mechanically equated the two sets of immunities”). 
 130. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 n.1 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ilan Wurman, Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation, 37 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 939, 961 (2014). 
 133. See id. at 955 (“[T]he Court seems to have dramatically altered qualified immunity 
doctrine in the context of Bivens actions when it had less need (if any at all) to shape the doc-
trine as a matter of statutory interpretation. The doctrine may have been trending in this direc-
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possibility sometimes suggest that it was therefore improper for the Supreme 
Court to expand the new standard into the § 1983 domain.134 
The methodological-freedom point seems right, especially given the 
Court’s concurrent invocations of historical traditions when recognizing 
immunities in the § 1983 context.135 Moreover, in a case decided shortly after 
Harlow, Justice Marshall (with whom Justice Blackmun joined and Justice 
Brennan agreed) suggested that the Court enjoyed greater flexibility to ex-
pand immunities in Bivens actions than in § 1983 suits.136 
But was there more to the relationship between Bivens and Harlow? 
James Pfander posits that the connection ran deeper than a mere facilitative 
function in a particular respect. He argues that the “pressure for a uniform 
federal standard that led in part to the recognition of Bivens liability” follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins137 “also 
produced a federal immunity rule” because “[v]ictims and government offi-
cials alike can make a strong claim for a consistent federal standard.”138 But 
Pfander points out that “the need for a uniform standard does not necessari-
ly entail federal judicial control of the content of the standard or the adop-
tion of the Harlow rule.”139 
As for judicial control and content, at least a couple of scholars have 
suggested that official-immunity doctrines could be viewed as court-
 
tion, but it was in the context of Bivens that matters of policy took the reins completely and the 
Court abandoned any common law underpinnings to immunity doctrine.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Atten-
tion to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 68 (1989); Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional 
Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 383–84 (1989) [hereinafter Gildin, Im-
munizing Intentional Violations]; Gary S. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 
and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 587 (1983); Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights 
Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 984 (1989); Stephen J. Shapiro, Public 
Officials’ Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its Prog-
eny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 267–68 (1989). 
 135. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529–42 (1984) (judicial immunity), super-
seded in part by statute, Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–317, 110 
Stat. 3847 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–29 
(1976) (prosecutorial immunity). 
 136. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 364 n.33 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my 
view, we should be even more reluctant to import absolute immunities into § 1983 suits than 
into Bivens actions. First, with § 1983 we deal with explicit statutory language indicating the 
broad scope of the action, whereas Bivens actions have been implied by the federal courts. Sec-
ond, the need to restrain state action implicit in the 14th Amendment is implicated by § 1983 
suits, while that Amendment has no relevance to suits against federal officials.”); id. at 346 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing agreement with the relevant portion of Marshall’s dis-
sent). 
 137. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 138. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional 
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1415–16 (2010). 
 139. Id. at 1416. 
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sponsored efforts to curtail the availability of constitutional-tort causes of 
action. Baude says that someone could “imagine a separate and distinct two-
wrongs-make-a-right argument for qualified immunity in the Bivens con-
text,”140 like the argument that Scalia advanced in the Monroe v. Pape con-
text.141 And Richard Fallon says that “one might well think of official im-
immunity as limiting the scope of causes of action for damages.”142 These 
suggestions are both hypothetical and parenthetical. But as the analysis be-
low argues, Supreme Court jurisprudence traces the outlines of just such an 
account, rooted in separation-of-powers concerns. 
B. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic 
By situating Harlow within the pertinent jurisprudential context, it be-
comes evident that the Bivens backdrop likely loomed larger than previous 
commentators have credited. The Bivens regime emerged during a time 
when the Supreme Court regularly recognized implied causes of action in 
the statutory sphere. As it moved away from this practice for separation-of-
powers reasons, the Court increasingly looked askance at Bivens actions too. 
Harlow provided an oblique opportunity to act on this escalating skepticism. 
1. Bivens’s Rise and Retrenchment 
The Supreme Court decided Bivens, which involved a warrantless arrest 
of the plaintiff and search of his home, in 1971. The Court acknowledged 
that neither the Constitution nor any congressional enactment expressly 
provided for damages liability against federal officials for constitutional vio-
lations.143 Nevertheless, the Court stated that “where federally protected 
rights have been invaded, . . . courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so 
as to grant the necessary relief.”144 Ultimately, the Court held that the plain-
tiff was “entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered 
as a result of the [defendants’] violation of the [Fourth] Amendment.”145 
Within the next decade, the Court recognized implied constitutional 
causes of action in two additional cases. The first was Davis v. Passman,146 a 
1979 decision allowing an individual to sue a former congressman under the 
 
 140. Baude, supra note 3, at 63 n.99. 
 141. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); see also supra text accompanying notes 101–105. 
Because the Supreme Court has “mechanically equated the two sets of immunities” under 
§ 1983 and Bivens, however, Baude declines to “consider them separately.” Baude, supra note 3, 
at 50 n.14. 
 142. Fallon, supra note 72, at 487. 
 143. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396–97 (1971). 
 144. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 145. Id. at 397. 
 146. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for terminating her employ-
ment because of her sex.147 The second was Carlson v. Green,148 a 1980 deci-
sion permitting the family of a deceased prisoner to sue the director of the 
federal Bureau of Prisons under the Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment for failing to provide proper medical care.149 
Bivens came from a divided Court. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion 
for a five-justice majority, and Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment.150 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun each wrote a dissent, 
all arguing that the Court offended separation-of-powers principles by rec-
ognizing a cause of action without congressional authorization.151 Davis and 
Green, both also penned by Brennan,152 demonstrated continuing division. 
In Davis, Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist all dissented.153 
In Green, only Burger and Rehnquist dissented,154 but Powell, joined by 
Stewart, authored an acerbic concurrence in the judgment.155 With one un-
important exception,156 all of the separate opinions in Davis and Green ech-
oed the Bivens dissents by referencing separation-of-powers concerns.157 
 
 147. Davis, 442 U.S. at 244–45. 
 148. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 149. Green, 446 U.S. at 20. 
 150. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 398. 
 151. Id. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I dissent from today’s holding which judi-
cially creates a damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not enacted by Con-
gress. We would more surely preserve the important values of the doctrine of separation of 
powers—and perhaps get a better result—by recommending a solution to the Congress as the 
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested the legislative power.”); id. at 428 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he point of this case and the fatal weakness in the Court’s judgment 
is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation creating such a right 
of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that the Constitution does 
not give us.”); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that for the truly aggrieved 
person other quite adequate remedies have always been available. If not, it is the Congress and 
not this Court that should act.”). 
 152. Green, 446 U.S. at 15; Davis, 442 U.S. at 229. 
 153. Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–55. 
 154. Green, 446 U.S. at 30–54. 
 155. Id. at 25–30. 
 156. In Davis, Stewart dissented on the ground that the Court should have vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case for the court of appeals to address an immunity under the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Davis, 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Rehnquist joined 
Stewart’s opinion but also joined the other two dissents. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. 
at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I dissent because, for me, the case presents very 
grave questions of separation of powers . . . . Congress could, of course, make Bivens-type rem-
edies available to its staff employees—and to other congressional employees—but it has not 
done so.”); id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s discussion of the federal 
judiciary’s purported “obligation to entertain private suits that Congress has not authorized” 
and arguing that “[i]n the present case, . . . principles of comity and separation of powers 
should require a federal court to stay its hand”); Green, 446 U.S. at 29 (Powell, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“In my view, the Court’s willingness to infer federal causes of action that can-
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The Supreme Court has since taken a dim view of this line of precedent. 
As Ziglar v. Abbasi158 put it in 2017, to understand Bivens, Davis, and Green, 
it is necessary to understand the prevailing law when they were decided. In 
the mid-20th century, the Court followed a different approach to recogniz-
ing implied causes of action than it follows now. During this “ancien re-
gime,” the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to “provide 
such remedies as are necessary to make effective” a statute’s purpose. Thus, 
as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes 
of action not explicit in the statutory text itself.159 
According to the Abbasi Court, Bivens essentially imported this framework 
from the statutory context into the constitutional context, but afterward, 
“the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for damages began 
to lose their force.”160 
Indeed, by 1975, the Court had started to sour on the implication prac-
tice in the statutory arena,161 and in 1979, the Court declared that “the judi-
cial task was . . . ‘limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to 
create the private right of action asserted.’ ”162 Judges, the Court ultimately 
said, must “interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it 
displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private reme-
dy.”163 Without such an intent, the Court concluded, “a cause of action does 
not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might 
be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”164 
In view of this evolution, the Court has refused to recognize implied 
constitutional claims beyond the specific circumstances of Bivens, Davis, and 
Green. By repudiating Bivens’s rationale, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Abbasi left little hope for change. The Court stated that “it is a significant 
step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it 
 
not be found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers 
and hardly comports with a rational system of justice.”); id. at 30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(stating that he had thought that Bivens, where he expressed separation-of-powers concerns, 
was “wrongly decided”); id. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In my view, it is ‘an exercise of 
power that the Constitution does not give us’ for this Court to infer a private civil damages 
remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. The creation of 
such remedies is a task that is more appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere 
of authority.” (citation omitted) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 428 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting))). In Davis, the justices’ con-
cerns about interbranch conflict also revolved around the fact that the basis for the plaintiff’s 
suit was a congressman’s personnel decision. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–51 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); id. at 251–55 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 158. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 159. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (citations omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 287 (2001), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 1855–56 (collecting cases beginning with Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). 
 162. Id. at 1856 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)). 
 163. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
 164. Id. at 286–87. 
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has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of 
action for damages against federal officials in order to remedy a constitu-
tional violation.”165 Hence, Abbasi reaffirmed that “expanding the Bivens 
remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”166 Abbasi even declared it 
“possible that the analysis in the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been 
different if they were decided today.”167 
Several scholars have suggested that Abbasi “all but overrules Bivens.”168 
But others believe that the eulogy for Bivens is premature.169 Abbasi itself 
said that “it must be understood that this opinion is not intended to cast 
doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-
and-seizure context in which it arose.”170 Moreover, the Court continued, 
“[t]he settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law en-
forcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, 
are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.”171 So Bivens seems secure for 
the moment, at least in its original Fourth Amendment space.172 
 
 165. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. 
 166. Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). 
 167. Id. at 1856. 
 168. Michael Dorf, SCOTUS Severely Narrows Civil Rights Suits Against Federal Officers, 
DORF ON LAW (June 19, 2017, 12:44 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/scotus-severely-
narrows-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/KZV9-WLFL]; see, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, The Ziglar v. 
Abbasi Decision: Unsurprising and Devastating, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (June 20, 
2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/06/20/the-ziglar-v-abbasi-decision-unsurprising-and-
devastating/ [http://perma.cc/H87E-M3K2]; Steve Vladeck, On Justice Kennedy’s Flawed and 
Depressing Narrowing of Constitutional Damages Remedies, JUST SECURITY (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/42334/justice-kennedys-flawed-depressing-narrowing-
constitutional-damages-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/2TLW-LK9S]. 
 169. E.g., Richard M. Re, The Nine Lives of Bivens, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 22, 2017, 8:30 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-nine-lives-of-bivens.html 
[https://perma.cc/JDT6-BPJU]. 
 170. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. 
 171. Id. at 1857. 
 172. Abbasi was decided by a six-member bench because of recusals by Justices So-
tomayor and Kagan and because the oral argument occurred before Justice Gorsuch joined the 
Court. See id. at 1851. The majority therefore consisted only of Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. The slim line-up seems unimportant, however, for there 
is little reason to think that either Gorsuch or Justice Kavanaugh, who has since replaced Ken-
nedy, would disagree with the majority’s cabining of the Bivens regime. See Meshal v. Hig-
genbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 429–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The 
[Supreme] Court has emphasized that it is ordinarily Congress’s role, not the Judiciary’s, to 
create and define the scope of federal tort remedies. As the Court has explained, Bivens carved 
out only a narrow exception to that bedrock separation of powers principle.”); id. at 431 (“If I 
were a Member of Congress, I might vote to enact a new tort cause of action to cover a case like 
[the one at bar]. But as judges, we do not get to make that decision.”); Harsh Voruganti, Judge 
Neil Gorsuch – Nominee to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Part Five – Bivens and 
1983, VETTING ROOM (Mar. 21, 2017), https://vettingroom.org/2017/03/21/judge-neil-
gorsuch-nominee-to-be-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-part-five-bivens-and-1983/ 
[https://perma.cc/9AVT-YR7B] (“In his twelve years on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch has voted 
to dismiss Bivens and § 1983 cases over 60 times, while only voting to grant in a handful of 
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How does Harlow fit into this history? In 1982, the year that it decided 
Harlow, the Supreme Court had recently started rejecting the “ancien re-
gime” of recognizing implied statutory causes of action.173 And, fresh from 
bruising battles in Davis and Green, the Court would soon begin rebuffing 
attempts to expand Bivens beyond the confines of the first three cases. In-
deed, the Court would ultimately refuse to recognize implied constitutional 
claims in every subsequent case to decide the issue.174 Harlow thus stood 
astride a jurisprudential inflection point at which Bivens faced a developing 
danger from several justices’ separation-of-powers concerns with the judicial 
recognition of implied causes of action. 
To be sure, in Butz v. Economou, the Court had said that “[t]he presence 
or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is, 
of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for dam-
ages for a particular violation of the Constitution” but that “once this analy-
sis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of 
congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity.”175 Four 
members of the Court had apparently disagreed with that statement even 
then, however, signing on to a separate opinion dissenting in relevant part 
and suggesting that the absence of congressional authorization was indeed 
pertinent to the immunity issue.176 
Importantly, the defendant government officials in Harlow framed the 
matter closely along the lines of the justices’ growing skepticism toward the 
Bivens remedy. In his opening statement, their attorney characterized official 
immunity as a means of preventing “the already slack criteria for inferring a 
private cause of action from a constitutionally protected right” from being 
“stretch[ed] completely out of shape.”177 Consequently, the arc of the Court’s 
jurisprudence implies a separation-of-powers connection between Bivens 
and Harlow, and the defendants’ argument corroborates this connection. 
 
cases. . . . Looking at Gorsuch’s Bivens and § 1983 jurisprudence, it is difficult to see a com-
mitment to check government power.”). 
 173. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001). 
 174. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855. 
 175. 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978). 
 176. Economou, 438 U.S. at 525–26 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (No. 
79-1738). The defendants’ attorney was also in favor of adopting an objective standard for 
qualified immunity on the ground that doing so “would be a contraction of the very wide rami-
fications of the combination of Butz against Economou on the one side and Bivens on the oth-
er.” Id. at 22. This “combination,” the attorney said, had “generate[d] over 2,000 Bivens type 
cases now pending, of which to date only nine have resulted in the award of damages.” Id. He 
characterized this as “an enormous volume of litigation with dubious public policy benefit.” Id. 
The briefing was of a piece. See Reply Brief for Petitioners Harlow & Butterfield, Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731 (No. 79-1738), 1981 WL 390512, at *8–9 & n.5. 
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2. Justice Powell’s Relevance 
Strengthening this connection are the views of Justice Powell, Harlow’s 
author. Dissenting in Davis and concurring in the judgment in Green, Powell 
staked out an ambivalent and idiosyncratic approach to the Bivens regime—
an approach that later resonated throughout Harlow. 
Powell strongly opposed recognizing implied causes of action in the 
statutory setting, arguing that the practice violated constitutional separation-
of-powers rules. In his 1979 dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,178 for 
instance, he declared that “ ‘the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has 
now been made clear’ and compels us to abandon the implication doc-
trine.”179 
Powell’s resistance to implied causes of action carried over into the 
Bivens setting, albeit to a lesser degree. In Green, Powell wrote that “the 
Court’s willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be found in 
the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers and hardly comports with a rational system of justice.”180 He expressed 
similar sentiments in Davis.181 He was unwilling to repudiate the Bivens re-
gime entirely, however, and in this context, he pitched his separation-of-
powers concerns on subconstitutional terrain.182 
Notwithstanding these objections, Powell embraced the Bivens regime’s 
broad understanding of the judicial role by advocating a wide berth for 
“principled discretion.”183 He said that “[a] plaintiff who seeks his remedy 
directly under the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essen-
tially legislative task.”184 In carrying out this task, he argued, courts should 
“take into account [a range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the 
range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statu-
tory authorization of a traditional remedy.”185 Powell, moreover, did not be-
 
 178. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 179. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938)). 
 180. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 29 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 181. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 252 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority’s discussion of the federal judiciary’s purported “obligation to entertain private 
suits that Congress has not authorized” and arguing that “[i]n the present case, . . . principles of 
comity and separation of powers should require a federal court to stay its hand”). 
 182. See id. at 252–53 (stating that “at least since Bivens,” it had “been clear” that “in ap-
propriate circumstances private causes of action may be inferred from provisions of the Con-
stitution” but that the Court had “recognized that the principle of separation of powers 
continues to have force as a matter of policy”); see also Green, 446 U.S. at 29 n.2 (Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to 
infer causes of action from statutes as from the Constitution.”). 
 183. Green, 446 U.S. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Davis, 442 
U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 184. Id. at 28; see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 185. Green, 446 U.S. at 28 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 
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lieve that judicial discretion to shape the contours of constitutional adjudica-
tion was limited to the question whether to recognize implied causes of ac-
tion. He declared it “settled,” for instance, that “where discretion exists, a 
variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead a federal court to re-
fuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented constitutional claim,” cit-
ing several federalism-related abstention decisions.186 And he implicitly 
acknowledged that qualified immunity could provide a functional backstop 
to undesired expansions of Bivens liability.187 
To put everything together, Powell thought that although courts could 
authorize Bivens suits, they should use that authority sparingly for reasons 
grounded in separation-of-powers principles—and that they should con-
template a wide range of policy considerations in doing so. Moreover, Powell 
endorsed applying a similar framework to other areas where judicial discre-
tion could influence constitutional adjudication. And he indicated an aware-
ness that official-immunity rules could limit the effects of the Bivens regime. 
It requires little imagination to see how all of this seems to have mapped 
onto Powell’s majority opinion in Harlow. There, the Court set aside the di-
rect Bivens question concerning the existence of a cause of action under the 
First Amendment,188 for the issue was apparently not properly presented.189 
But Harlow still offered an indirect opportunity to sap the strength of the 
Bivens regime by bolstering qualified immunity. In short, the Court—and 
especially Justice Powell—likely saw enhancing immunity protections as a 
suitable substitute for reining in Bivens itself. 
Powell’s case file for Harlow is consistent with this possibility in several 
ways. The papers, for instance, suggest that Powell alighted on the objective 
standard for qualified immunity in the middle of the drafting process: the 
majority apparently had not assented to this formulation when the opinion 
 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)); Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(same). 
 186. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 253 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 187. In Green, the majority reasoned that concerns about overdeterring officials from 
effectively performing their duties were irrelevant to the Bivens analysis because “qualified 
immunity . . . provides adequate protection.” Green, 446 U.S. at 19. Powell’s opinion plainly 
recognized the push–pull that this understanding of the two doctrines entailed: Bivens would 
begin where qualified immunity ended. See id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that the majority concluded that “qualified immunity affords all the protection neces-
sary to ensure the effective performance of official duties”). 
 188. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820 n.36 (1982). 
 189. See Brief for Respondent, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (No. 79-1738), 
1981 WL 389866, at *42 (“The district court’s ruling that Fitzgerald has constitutional and im-
plied statutory causes of action was not appealable as a collateral order, nor was it certified for 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issue was not before the court of appeals. 
In their petition for a writ of certiorari, Harlow and Butterfield did not present the question for 
review. Rather, they expressly informed this Court that the issue was not ‘immediately appeal-
able’ and that it was not included in their notices of appeal to the court of appeals.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.9, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (No. 80–
945))). 
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assignment went out.190 He also expressed concerns about the Court’s statu-
tory-implication jurisprudence when corresponding with a colleague.191 And 
he appears to have personally requested that his clerk add a footnote dis-
claiming any approval of the district court’s recognition of a Bivens cause of 
action and suggesting that the matter could be reconsidered on remand.192 
To be sure, the case file does not seem to spell out an anti-Bivens attitude to-
ward qualified immunity in so many words. But the majority opinion in 
Harlow is in harmony with Powell’s overarching approach to Bivens claims. 
C. One Wrinkle 
One wrinkle bears considering before moving on. The plaintiff in Har-
low sued not only under Bivens to vindicate his First Amendment rights, but 
also under two federal statutes to vindicate subconstitutional rights to testify 
before Congress.193 Neither statute “expressly create[d] a private right to sue 
for damages,” and the Court remanded the question whether to recognize 
implied causes of action for the lower courts to consider alongside the Bivens 
issue.194 Someone could thus argue that Harlow was not a pure Bivens case in 
the way that the separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account ad-
vanced here might suggest. 
Any such argument should not detain the analysis long. Notwithstand-
ing the presence of statutory claims, the Court focused on the First Amend-
ment claim in fashioning the standard for qualified immunity. Indeed, the 
Court often discussed the doctrine as if it applied in the constitutional con-
text only.195 And Justice Brennan’s concurrence, which Justices Marshall and 
 
 190. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to 
Richard H. Fallon, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1982), in 84 POWELL PAPERS 3, 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=casefiles 
[https://perma.cc/468G-ZD63]. 
 191. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Paul 
Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 1982), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 
190, at 11. 
 192. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., No. 80-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald 1 (Feb. 15, 1982) 
(unpublished draft opinion), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 190, at 324 (expressing a desire to 
address “the Bivens issue” in edits directed to his clerk); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Harlow and 
Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 18 n.31 (Feb. 27, 1982) (unpublished chamber draft), in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra note 190, at 283 (adding a Bivens-related footnote). 
 193. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 805 & n.10. 
 194. Id. at 805–06, 819–20, 820 n.36. 
 195. See, e.g., id. at 814 (“In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer 
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”). But the Court did not 
always limit its discussion of qualified immunity to the constitutional context. See, e.g., id. at 
819 (“Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory 
or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate . . . .”). 
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Blackmun joined, discussed qualified immunity vis-à-vis constitutional 
claims exclusively.196 
In light of the evidence outlined here, therefore, there is little reason to 
think that the incidental presence of statutory claims weakens the contention 
that Harlow rested in part on separation-of-powers objections to the Bivens 
regime. Indeed, for the reasons discussed below, the Court treated the vio-
lence that a qualified-immunity standard arising in the Bivens context might 
do to statutory causes of action as collateral damage—or even as a welcome 
consequence. 
III. EXPLORING THE § 1983 EXTENSION 
The Supreme Court soon expanded the Harlow standard beyond the 
Bivens environment into the separate § 1983 domain. This Part begins by 
outlining previous academic appraisals of that maneuver. It then reconsiders 
the Court’s reasoning for stretching the Harlow standard to cover state offi-
cials, revealing a line of logic rooted in federalism concerns. 
A. Previous Understandings 
There was no § 1983 claim at issue in Harlow.197 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority chose to address that context in the following footnote, which quoted 
the Supreme Court’s 1978 opinion in Butz v. Economou: 
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity avail-
able to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. We have found previously, however, that it would be “untenable to 
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought 
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials.”198 
A few scholars have suggested that this remark represented a mere statement 
of fact, such that the Court reserved for another day the question whether 
the new qualified-immunity standard would govern § 1983 suits.199 But most 
commentators have apparently long viewed Harlow as answering that ques-
tion.200 Moreover, in the § 1983 case of Sanborn v. Wolfel,201 the Court 
 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 820–21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I agree with the substantive stand-
ard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defendant ‘knew 
or should have known’ of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions.”); id. at 821 (“[T]he 
clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just pun-
ishment for his crimes.”). 
 197. Id. at 818 n.30 (majority opinion). 
 198. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)). 
 199. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 134, at 267 & n.122. 
 200. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 148 n.38; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and 
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judg-
ment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 691 n.31 (2014); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. 
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granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded with 
instructions for the court of appeals to consider Harlow, which had come 
down just four days earlier. As is customary with “grant, vacate, and re-
mand” (GVR) dispositions, the Court provided very little reasoning. But it 
did include a quotation of the same statement from Economou on which the 
footnote in Harlow relied.202 
In any event, Davis v. Scherer,203 issued two years later by a Court with 
the same composition as in Harlow and also authored by Justice Powell, 
made clear that the Harlow standard governed § 1983 suits.204 There, the 
Court blessed applying Harlow to the § 1983 proceeding at bar with (among 
other statements) the following portion of a footnote, which again cited 
Economou: “Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our 
cases have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits 
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers under 
Bivens . . . .”205 This footnote also pointed out that Harlow’s holding refer-
enced “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights,”206 which Scher-
er said embraced the statutory-rights component of § 1983.207 
Accordingly, the claim that the Bivens backdrop appears to have in-
spired the rise of Harlow-style qualified immunity is one of inclusion rather 
than exclusion. Although a separation-of-powers response to the Bivens re-
gime likely played an important part in producing the Harlow standard, it 
did not constitute the whole picture. Indeed, the Court seems to have simul-
taneously accepted and even welcomed the prospect of expanding the new 
standard into the § 1983 setting. 
There are many possible reasons why the Court thought that the Harlow 
model should apply in the § 1983 context. The only one that it initially cited, 
however, was a desire to adhere to the statement from Economou. And that 
choice has received very little scrutiny. For even when scholars appreciate 
the path-dependent history of the Harlow standard, they seem often simply 
to accept the Court’s snippet-like references to Economou as sufficient to jus-
tify importing that standard from the Bivens arena to the § 1983 setting.208 A 
few scholars, however, have dug a bit deeper. 
 
Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy 
Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2209 n.42 (2003); Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity 
for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 
YALE L.J. 126, 133 n.34 (1985); Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement 
the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 915 n.81 
(1984). 
 201. 458 U.S. 1102 (1982). 
 202. Wolfel, 458 U.S. at 1102 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)). 
 203. 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 
 204. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 190–91, 193–95, 197. 
 205. Id. at 194 n.12 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)). 
 206. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 207. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12. 
 208. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 200. 
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In Economou, the Court stated that it would have been “untenable to 
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought 
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Con-
stitution against federal officials.”209 As framed by an argument made by the 
defendants, the question that the Court was addressing was whether to ramp 
down the protection previously afforded federal officials in some actions 
(absolute immunity) to match that afforded state officials in § 1983 suits 
(good-faith immunity).210 Answering in the affirmative, the Court said that 
allowing federal officials to claim absolute immunity as a matter of course 
would have eviscerated the Bivens regime.211 Thus, the argument from some 
scholars goes, Economou established the “equivalency between the two kinds 
of constitutional tort cases . . . in a case which reduced the insulation afford-
ed federal officials to the same level as that of their state counterparts, in or-
der to preserve the efficacy of a parallel remedy that the Court created judi-
judicially.”212 
With the Harlow regime, the Court did the opposite. It increased the in-
sulation afforded federal officials to a higher level than that of their state 
counterparts and then increased the insulation afforded state officials to a 
corresponding degree, with both moves reducing access to corrective 
measures.213 This exercise, the argument proceeds, improperly elevated the 
mere means by which the Court adjusted official-immunity standards in 
Economou (rendering them equivalent for federal and state officials) above 
the more important ends for which it did so (preserving a rights-protective 
cause of action).214 
Put differently, some scholars see the original sin against Economou as 
Harlow’s election to strengthen the protection available to federal officials 
beyond that previously available to state officials. That decision, they reason, 
both disrupted the parallel nature of official immunity in the Bivens and 
§ 1983 contexts and made constitutional rights more difficult to enforce. 
These scholars thus conclude that the Court’s subsequent election to extend 
the same protection to state officials served to obscure rather than absolve 
this initial transgression.215 
 
 209. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). 
 210. See id. at 485–504. 
 211. See id. at 501. 
 212. Oren, supra note 134, at 982–83 (emphasis omitted). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations, supra note 134, at 382 (stating that 
the reasoning in the Harlow footnote extending the new qualified-immunity standard to 
§ 1983 cases “is facially unassailable, which no doubt accounts for its universal acceptance by 
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts,” but that “[w]hen it made the policy judgment to 
abrogate the subjective tier of the immunity in Harlow, the Court abandoned the leading 
premise of its syllogism—that the immunity of federal officials must be no greater than the 
immunity of state officers”). 
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B. The Federalism Line of Logic 
The preceding argument from prior scholarship looks more to the 
broader context than to the specific reasoning of Economou. Aside from pre-
serving Bivens by declining to endorse absolute immunity for such causes of 
action in particular, why did the Supreme Court apparently believe it im-
portant for state and federal officials to bear equivalent burdens in general? 
And why did Harlow and its progeny come to the same conclusion under 
much different circumstances? Venturing answers to these questions uncov-
ers a murky federalism connection that may help explain the Court’s deci-
sion to expand the Harlow standard into the § 1983 sphere. 
1. The Reasoning Behind Economou 
Recall that in 1974, the Supreme Court extended the good-faith im-
munity available in § 1983 suits from the false-arrest context of Pierson v. 
Ray to state-level executive action at large in Scheuer v. Rhodes.216 Then in 
1978, the Court extended the same immunity to Bivens actions in Econo-
mou.217 The Court’s reasoning suggests at least four explanations for this as-
pect of Economou—which one could call the “equivalence directive.” As the 
following discussion makes plain, the fourth is especially relevant here. 
The first explanation turns on a broad understanding of binding prece-
dent. “The Court’s opinion in Scheuer,” said Economou, “relied on prece-
dents dealing with federal as well as state officials, analyzed the issue of 
executive immunity in terms of general policy considerations, and stated its 
conclusion . . . in the same universal terms.”218 Consequently, Economou 
concluded that “[t]he analysis presented in [Scheuer] cannot be limited to 
actions against state officials.”219 But to the extent that Scheuer, a § 1983 case, 
said anything about Bivens actions, such statements were plainly dicta. 
Of course, the rationales for applying a particular immunity standard in 
§ 1983 suits could have carried persuasive force in the Bivens context. Hence, 
the second explanation for the equivalence directive: Economou stated that 
“Scheuer was intended to guide the federal courts in resolving th[e] tension” 
between “the plaintiff’s right to compensation” and “the need to protect the 
decisionmaking processes of an executive department” in “the myriad factu-
al situations in which it might arise.”220 The Court continued: “[W]e see no 
reason why [Scheuer] should not supply the governing principles for resolv-
ing this dilemma in the case of federal officials.”221 Someone could view these 
statements (and others) as asserting that the same policy notions that sup-
 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. 
 218. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503–04 (1978). 
 219. Id. at 504. 
 220. Id. at 503. 
 221. Id. 
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ported employing good-faith immunity in the § 1983 context of Scheuer 
supported doing the same in the Bivens context of Economou.222 
Assuming that policy notions are a proper source of law in the Bivens 
arena, it is not obvious that the considerations driving how courts handle 
constitutional claims against state officials will always apply to suits against 
federal officials. Basic noninterference principles would warrant pausing 
over that proposition in at least some circumstances. The Court declared just 
a few years before Economou, after all, that the concept of “Our Federalism” 
occupies “a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.”223 
This concept, the Court said, requires respect for the idea that “the National 
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal 
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not 
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”224 
Economou’s discussion of lower-court cases subsequent to Scheuer sug-
gests a third explanation for the equivalence directive: that a two-track 
standard for qualified immunity—one for state officials and one for federal 
officials—would prove unworkable in practice.225 Certainly, a single standard 
would be most convenient.226 But in Economou, at least, the losing contender 
for the standard to govern federal officials was absolute immunity, which is 
relatively easy to apply.227 It is not extraordinary, moreover, for different 
standards to constrain the conduct of different classes of officials. Various 
federal statutes pertain only to federal actors, for instance.228 In addition, 
courts could make clear how to assess which cause of action and affiliated 
immunity principles should apply to officials who act in joint federal–state 
capacities.229 And intergovernmental indemnification agreements could alle-
viate lingering concerns. 
 
 222. These policy notions included avoiding “the injustice, particularly in the absence of 
bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his po-
sition, to exercise discretion,” as well as avoiding “the danger that the threat of such liability 
would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment re-
quired by the public good.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). 
 223. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
 224. Id. at 44. 
 225. See Economou, 438 U.S. at 498–500. 
 226. Economou, for example, quoted one lower-court case saying that “the practical ad-
vantage of having just one federal immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is self-
evident.” Id. at 499–500 (quoting Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 227. Id. at 485. 
 228. The Hatch Act provides a prominent example. See Hatch Act, P.L. 76-252, 53 Stat. 
1147 (1939); see also Hatch Act, OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Pages/HatchAct.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7KFC-WKJ7] (explaining that the Hatch Act “limits certain political activi-
ties of federal employees, as well as some state, D.C., and local government employees who 
work in connection with federally funded programs”). 
 229. For example, issues surrounding officials acting in joint federal–state capacities of-
ten arise with respect to the National Guard. Courts appear generally to hold that constitution-
al-tort suits in this context sound in § 1983, not Bivens—but that the Feres doctrine and its 
offspring (which bar damages actions deriving from military-related disputes, see Feres v. 
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The fourth explanation for the equivalence directive is that “[t]o create a 
system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state 
officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional de-
sign on its head.”230 As Economou made clear, the Bill of Rights originally 
restrained federal officials only: incorporation against the states came later 
with the Fourteenth Amendment.231 So the Court suggested that it would 
have offended long-held constitutional commitments to allow federal offi-
cials to escape liability for violating individual rights where their state coun-
terparts could not. Federalism concerns appear to have helped animate the 
equivalence directive from the very start. 
2. Ensuing Entreaties Toward Equivalence 
The Supreme Court relied on Economou’s equivalence directive to justi-
fy extending the Harlow standard from the Bivens arena to the § 1983 setting 
in Harlow, Wolfel, and Scherer.232 Just as Economou appears to rest in signifi-
cant part on federalism concerns, so too do these ensuing entreaties toward 
equivalence. In particular, the Court seems to have wanted to safeguard state 
actors in the name of federalism by requiring them to comply with constitu-
tional commands no more demanding than their federal counterparts con-
fronted. 
Again, both the broader context and Justice Powell’s jurisprudence sup-
port this notion. As for context, “the Burger Court sought to revitalize con-
stitutional federalism” in multiple areas.233 And a handful of scholars has 
long perceived a vague federalism justification for applying qualified im-
munity in the § 1983 setting.234 As for Powell, he not only penned Harlow 
and Scherer (and, as it turns out, suggested that the Court quote the equiva-
 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)), dispose of such claims. See, e.g., Watson v. Ark. Nat’l 
Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1005–08 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 230. Economou, 438 U.S. at 504. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 198–205. 
 233. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinc-
tion Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 868 (2013). 
 234. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 
1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147, 168–69 (stating that qualified immunity “prevents federal 
judges from intruding unnecessarily into areas of state and local prerogative”); Sheldon 
Nahmod, The Long and Winding Road from Monroe to Connick, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 427, 
427–28 (2012) (“The Court’s interest in federalism in the § 1983 setting includes an increasing 
concern with federal judicial intervention in, and second-guessing of, the decisions of local 
governments. Federalism, broadly defined, has affected . . . the extent of the absolute and quali-
fied immunity of state and local government officials.”); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. 
Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (2015) (stating that “in the quali-
fied immunity context, . . . federal courts exercise discretion to decide the constitutionality of 
acts committed by state officials against the backdrop of federalism concerns”). 
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lence directive in Wolfel235), but he also authored several opinions directly 
indicating a desire to rein in litigation against state-affiliated defendants or 
implicating state-affiliated interests for federalism-related reasons.236 
Powell’s dissent in Owen v. City of Independence237 is especially reveal-
ing. There, the majority held that official immunity was unavailable for mu-
nicipal entities sued under § 1983.238 Joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, Powell argued that “[i]mportant public poli-
cies” supported extending immunity protections to local governments.239 He 
contended that withholding such protections “may restrict the independence 
of local governments and their ability to respond to the needs of their com-
munities.”240 These concerns would have naturally translated into a belief 
that qualified-immunity doctrine should not have required state officials to 
comply with a more intrusive standard of conduct than their federal coun-
terparts faced.241 
In sum, the Supreme Court repeatedly justified extending the Harlow 
standard from the Bivens environment to the § 1983 sphere by invoking 
Economou’s statement that it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for 
purposes of immunity law” between these contexts.242 And jurisprudential 
clues suggest that a central aim of employing the equivalence directive in this 
way was to safeguard state actors for federalism reasons by subjecting them 
to commands no more demanding than their federal counterparts confront-
ed. 
Again, Justice Powell’s Harlow papers lend this interpretation support. 
They show, for instance, that it was Powell who proposed the quotation of 
the equivalence directive in the Wolfel GVR.243 And they show that when do-
ing so, he told his colleagues that he “believe[d] that the Harlow standard 
 
 235. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 236. See George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Dedication, Justice Powell’s Constitutional Opin-
ions, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (1988) (emphasizing federalism as a theme). 
 237. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
 238. Owen, 445 U.S. at 622. 
 239. Id. at 667 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. at 668. 
 241. A few other examples of relevant Powell opinions may prove helpful. As discussed 
above, Powell endorsed federalism-related abstention principles in Davis v. Passman, see supra 
text accompanying note 186, and as discussed below, he advocated applying more lenient 
standards to state actors than federal actors when incorporating constitutional rights against 
the states, see infra text accompanying notes 323–327. Powell was also a strong supporter of 
state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). And three days before Harlow 
was issued, he argued that § 1983 plaintiffs should be required to exhaust state administrative 
remedies before bringing suit. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 531–36 (1982) (Powell, 
J., dissenting). 
 242. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). 
 243. Memorandum to the Conference, Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court (June 23, 1982), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 190, at 119. 
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should be applicable” to cases arising under § 1983.244 Given his concern for 
furthering state and local interests in relevant contexts, the fact that Powell 
led the charge to expand the Harlow standard into the § 1983 domain 
strengthens the federalism connection posited here. 
To review, prior scholarship has missed something significant about 
qualified immunity. The governing standard arose in Harlow, a Bivens case, 
and ample evidence suggests that this background may have contributed to 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in multiple important and overlooked re-
spects. These include supplying two potential justifications for enhancing the 
protection afforded by qualified immunity, both of which sound in constitu-
tional structure. First, in articulating the Harlow standard, the Court appears 
to have responded to a perceived separation-of-powers problem underlying 
Bivens’s increase in liability with a corresponding increase in immunity. Sec-
ond, in extending the Harlow standard from Bivens actions to § 1983 suits, 
the Court appears to have relied on a perceived federalism-related impera-
tive not to hold state officials to a higher bar than federal officials encoun-
tered. 
C. Two Qualifications 
Two qualifications are appropriate at this point. First, the focus here is 
on a particular structural account of qualified immunity—and, therefore, on 
Harlow, which most clearly crystallized this account. But the intent is not to 
imply that one should view these considerations of constitutional structure 
as the only, or even the primary, inputs in producing the doctrine—or that 
one should see Harlow’s publication as the only, or even the primary, mo-
ment that matters. Other forces, including additional structural factors and 
the factors on the face of the justices’ opinions, have surely played a role in 
shaping the Court’s thinking about qualified immunity. The primary conse-
quence of this qualification is that the case for rejecting the doctrine must 
turn on analyses beyond the present examination. The discussion below thus 
explores the upshots of the structural account advanced here for the proprie-
ty of qualified immunity more generally.245 
Second, this examination emphasizes Justice Powell’s positions. This is a 
valuable exercise because Powell authored Harlow and other pertinent opin-
ions. But an individual justice does not a Supreme Court make. The discus-
sion here thus points to Powell’s opinions primarily as underappreciated 
representatives of larger movements. Other justices, of course, have made 
significant marks on constitutional-tort jurisprudence too. Future projects 
examining such contributions should therefore prove fruitful in further il-
luminating this area. 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. See infra Section IV.C. 
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IV. ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT 
The discussion so far has mostly sought to establish a structural account 
of qualified immunity as a descriptive matter. This Part assesses the norma-
tive purchase of this account. The conclusion is that neither the separation-
of-powers principles nor the federalism concerns explored here provide suf-
ficient support for the Harlow standard as applied in Bivens actions or § 1983 
suits, respectively. 
Some preliminary observations provide an important preface. Scholars 
rarely evaluate qualified immunity in a bifurcated way. But the fact that the 
Harlow standard developed along separate paths for Bivens actions and 
§ 1983 suits helps illustrate why one should analyze the doctrine along dis-
tinct lines in these different contexts. Moreover, qualified immunity is not 
necessarily susceptible to the same criticisms in the federal-common-law set-
ting of Bivens and the statutory setting of § 1983. And even if qualified im-
munity runs afoul of good interpretive principles on an a priori basis in the 
§ 1983 domain, opponents cannot rest their case against the doctrine with-
out confronting subsequent questions. Is the Harlow standard nevertheless 
justifiable in the Bivens context? If so, does that render it justifiable on an a 
posteriori basis in the § 1983 context? 
Attempting to provide some answers, this Part appraises the merits and 
demerits of the separation-of-powers and federalism aspects of the structural 
account advanced here. These potential justifications for the current quali-
fied-immunity regime are powerful in many respects. But they ultimately fail 
to vindicate the Harlow standard in either of the spaces in which they apply. 
A. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic 
Inherent in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the notion that the Harlow 
standard lessens the impact of Bivens in allowing courts to recognize implied 
constitutional claims. To assess whether this notion offers a legitimate sepa-
ration-of-powers justification for the current qualified-immunity regime, the 
analysis must account for the perspectives of both Bivens advocates and 
Bivens antagonists. 
1. If Bivens Is Not Broken 
For those who believe that the Bivens regime rests on a lawful founda-
tion, two primary possibilities present themselves. First, invoking the maxim 
ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), some ob-
servers have argued that the Constitution commands that courts recognize 
Bivens claims, at least for some alleged violations or at least absent an effec-
tive alternative means for fully vindicating constitutional rights.246 These ar-
 
 246. Akhil Amar has advanced a well-known version of this argument. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485 (1987) (“The legal rights against 
governments enshrined in the Constitution strongly imply corresponding governmental obli-
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guments have often enlisted, to quote a proponent, “one of the most im-
portant and inspiring passages”247 from Marbury v. Madison.248 This passage 
proclaims that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he re-
ceives an injury”—and that “[o]ne of the first duties of government is to af-
ford that protection.”249 
Second, some commentators think that the Constitution permits, but 
does not require, the judiciary to recognize implied constitutional causes of 
action—at least, again, absent an effective alternative.250 A prominent ver-
sion of this view contends that the Bivens doctrine simply provides a damag-
es remedy where both a legal right and jurisdiction to adjudicate that right 
already exist—and that courts have long possessed authority to select among 
traditional remedies under such circumstances.251 
Someone who backs Bivens on either of these bases is unlikely to per-
ceive a separation-of-powers problem necessitating a qualified-immunity so-
lution.252 Under the starkest version of the former view, in which each right 
always requires the availability of a damages remedy, qualified immunity 
must be unconstitutional. And even under the latter, more lenient view, ad-
herents would seem likely to believe that the Bivens regime represents “a 
 
gations to ensure full redress whenever those rights are violated.”); id. at 1507 (discussing how 
Bivens “partially fulfilled” this principle). And John Harrison offers an insightful take. See John 
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1021 (2008) (stating that “[t]he Fourth and 
Eighth Amendments . . . are among the Constitution’s closest analogs to the law of tort,” such 
that “[i]f the tort-like rules that they impose on government officers differ from the rules the 
ordinary private law imposes on private people, then it is certainly plausible to say that they 
must have their own tort-like remedy because they have their own tort-like content”). For oth-
er work in this general vein, see, for example, Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-
Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995). 
 247. Amar, supra note 246, at 1486. 
 248. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 249. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
 250. Fallon and Meltzer’s theory of constitutional remedies fits into this category. Their 
article on constitutional remedies argues that “Marbury’s apparent promise of effective redress 
for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule.” Fallon & Meltzer, su-
pra note 124, at 1778. The article therefore calls it “regrettable, but tolerable” that “[t]here his-
torically always have been, and predictably will continue to be, cases in which effective 
individual redress is unavailable.” Id. at 1789. But “[w]hat would be intolerable,” it says, “is a 
regime of public administration that was systematically unanswerable to the restraints of law.” 
Id. The piece thus concludes that the primary question in deciding whether to recognize vari-
ous constitutional remedies should be whether “an overall structure of remedies adequate to 
preserve” governmental accountability exists. Id. 
 251. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236–48 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 405 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 252. This also holds true for those who back Bivens on a third basis: that subsequent leg-
islative events have “preserve[d] and ratif[ied] the Bivens remedy” in a manner that “puts the 
Bivens action on a much firmer federal statutory foundation, analogous if not identical to 
§ 1983.” James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitution-
al Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121, 123 (2009). 
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central means of vindicating, rather than aggrandizing, separated powers” 
because “the purpose of constitutional rights is to constrain the political 
branches, and not the other way around.”253 At bottom, this position affords 
courts substantial policymaking leeway, so the issue largely becomes whether 
the contours of qualified immunity make good sense. And for all of the rea-
sons that others have adduced (ranging from Chemerinsky’s corrective-
justice concerns to Huq’s distributive considerations to Schwartz’s practical 
problems—and beyond254), any attempt at defending the Harlow standard 
on policy grounds faces an uphill battle. 
The separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account advanced 
here arises from an ostensibly restorative relationship between Harlow and 
Bivens. But this logic appears unlikely to persuade those who see no need to 
restore anything in the first place, and at any rate, the question largely col-
lapses into a policy debate that advocates of qualified immunity appear to be 
losing. If Bivens is not broken, why fix it? 
2. Silver Bullet or Square Peg 
Others, of course, reject Bivens, viewing the regime as a judicial usurpa-
tion of legislative power (either as an initial or ongoing matter, setting aside 
different theories of stare decisis). Should these people see qualified immuni-
ty as a silver bullet for some portion of the Bivens problem, or should they 
see Harlow as having tried to fit a square peg into a round hole? The essence 
of the separation-of-powers reasoning explored above is that qualified im-
munity serves as a judge-made fix to a judge-made failure. But even for those 
who are amenable to such a consequentialist course of thought, the reason-
ing should fall flat. 
Drawing on work by philosopher David Hume, Adrian Vermeule de-
scribes counteracting institutional maneuvers in constitutional implementa-
tion as “compensating adjustments.”255 Put simply, this is “the idea that 
 
 253. Vladeck, supra note 168 (emphasis omitted); see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common 
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. 
U. L. REV. 761, 796–97 (1989) (reasoning that “the unrepresentativeness of the federal judici-
ary . . . imposes a political obligation on the judiciary to enforce the countermajoritarian norms 
of the Constitution,” such that it “is consistent with constitutional democratic theory to entrust 
to the judiciary the final say as how best to enforce and protect basic constitutional rights and 
interests”). Of course, someone who supports the Bivens remedy in some instances could also 
take a big-picture approach to questions about the availability of constitutional-tort causes of 
action and official-immunity doctrines, eschewing all-or-nothing answers in favor of seeking 
the best balance between the competing concerns driving doctrinal developments as a package. 
See Fallon, supra note 72, at 480. While someone who takes this approach could be relatively 
open to qualified immunity, it would still stand to reason that “immunity doctrine, as currently 
framed, rests on a number of shaky assumptions” and that “there might be better tools for 
achieving the same purposes.” Id. at 481. 
 254. See supra Section I.B. 
 255. Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 
(2003). Others described the concept of compensating adjustments in American constitutional 
implementation before Vermeule’s article. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth 
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multiple departures from the optimal or first-best constitutional arrange-
ments might offset each other,” thereby “ensur[ing] constitutional equilibri-
um.”256 This model seeks “simultaneously to identify both a departure from 
optimal constitutional design and an offsetting institutional adjustment that 
compensates for the initial defect.”257 For instance: 
If constitutional doctrine has permitted excessive delegations from Con-
gress to the President—excessive on either an originalist or a functional ac-
count—then a laudable compensating adjustment would be to allow the 
legislative veto, congressional restrictions on the appointments power, and 
other structural innovations intended to check the presidential power, even 
if those innovations would otherwise be unconstitutional.258 
And: 
If the President’s veto power has been effectively undermined by the in-
creasing incidence of omnibus legislation, which puts the President to an il-
legitimate all-or-nothing choice, then a laudable compensating adjustment 
would be to treat the Constitution as affording the President a line-item ve-
to, even if that is not the best textual or original interpretation of the veto 
power.259 
Other examples abound.260 
Vermeule calls this theory “second-best constitutionalism” for a rea-
son.261 The whole idea rests on the notion that a first-best option exists. And 
that notion rests on the further notion that the constitution in question pro-
vides a determinative-enough rule of decision along whatever dimension the 
interpreter favors (originalism, pragmatism, etc.). 
This observation produces two pertinent corollaries. First, only where 
the first-best option is actually or practically unavailable should one accept a 
second-best state of affairs. It may be preferable, therefore, to insist on re-
storing the former, if possible, rather than assent to enduring the latter.262 
 
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 26 (1988); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and 
the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). Still others have made valuable contributions to understandings 
of the concept since Vermeule’s article. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: 
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1733 (2005). I focus on Vermeule’s work, however, largely because of the relative clarity and 
detail with which he isolates and addresses the theoretical issues discussed here. 
 256. Vermeule, supra note 255, at 421. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 432 (footnotes omitted). 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 429–33; see also Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Consti-
tution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20–23 (2009). 
 261. Vermeule, supra note 255, at 421. 
 262. Vermeule assumes “an irreversible departure from, or violation of, ideal constitu-
tional design.” Id. at 426. And he notes that “[t]he analogy here is to a technical idea in eco-
nomics” that applies “[i]f perfect efficiency cannot be obtained.” Id. at 431 (citing R.G. Lipsey 
& R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956)). 
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Second, not all compensating adjustments are created equal. “A standard 
conceptual objection is that the policy of adjustment is indeterminate, as the 
interpreter may choose the margin on which the adjustment is made,” Ver-
meule explains.263 For instance, “[i]f sweeping delegations produce excessive 
presidential power, why adjust by upholding the legislative veto, as opposed 
to, say, granting Congress the commander-in-chief power?”264 Vermeule 
counters that second-best constitutionalism gives rise to some “easy cas-
es.”265 For instance, he says, “[i]f the growth of omnibus legislation has un-
dermined the veto power, we need no elaborate theoretical apparatus to 
appreciate that permitting the (otherwise suspect) line-item veto is a more 
fitting compensating adjustment than, say, making the veto immune from 
congressional override.”266 
Vermeule thus argues that some compensating adjustments are better 
than others, but he offers little explanation for why that may be. Baude ad-
vances the ball a bit. He draws a contrast between appropriate compensating 
adjustments on the one hand and Justice Scalia’s justification for qualified 
immunity in Crawford-El v. Britton on the other.267 Recall that this justifica-
tion contends that qualified immunity is permissible because Harlow con-
tracted liability after Monroe v. Pape had incorrectly expanded it.268 Baude 
points out that “[i]f one looks with a wide enough lens, one might say that 
it’s enough that the first decision erroneously expanded the number of law-
suits and the second decision will decrease the number of lawsuits.”269 But, 
he asserts, “with the lens that wide nearly every doctrine of constitutional 
law and civil procedure would be swept in,” meaning that “[t]he theory 
would not provide special justification for the doctrine of qualified immuni-
ty.”270 Instead, “to the extent that the original scheme had an animating pur-
pose or logic, one would expect the adjustment to be consistent with that 
purpose.”271 
What Vermeule and Baude appear to be driving toward is a distinction 
between the scope and substance of compensating adjustments. The best 
compensating adjustments, the thinking goes, respond not only to the quan-
titative aspects of the initial departures from optimal constitutional design 
 
 263. Id. at 433–34. 
 264. Id. at 434. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Baude, supra note 3, at 63, 68–69. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 101–105. 
 269. Baude, supra note 3, at 68. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. Thus, with respect to Scalia’s Crawford-El justification for qualified immunity, 
Baude says that “it would be a far closer approximation to the Frankfurterian scheme to re-
quire that § 1983 claims be exhausted or to substantively alter the doctrine for certain kinds of 
constitutional claims.” Id. at 68–69 (footnote omitted); see supra notes 107–109 and accompa-
nying text. 
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by offering modifications of roughly analogous scope. They respond also to 
the qualitative aspects of the initial departures by offering modifications of 
roughly antagonistic substance. The latter feature seems to entail advantages 
of both principle and practicality, allowing compensating adjustments to ad-
dress problems in particularized ways and to operate where the problems ac-
tually exist. So one might say that actions ought to have both equal and 
opposite reactions in the context of compensating adjustments. 
This framework helps show why addressing sweeping delegations by al-
lowing the legislative veto would be preferable to granting Congress the 
commander-in-chief power. The legislative veto would both reduce the 
problematic scope of presidential power in this context, its “excessive” quan-
tity (to quote Vermeule),272 and better counter the problematic substance of 
such power, its legislative quality. To combat increasing omnibus legislation, 
permitting the line-item veto would be superior to making the veto immune 
from congressional override for similar reasons. The line-item veto would 
both strengthen the veto power and bear a closer connection to the cause of 
the concern—Congress’s insistence on putting the president to “an illegiti-
mate or all-or-nothing choice” (to quote Vermeule again).273 
Applying this framework to the issue at hand suggests that qualified 
immunity represents a poor compensating adjustment for the separation-of-
powers error ostensibly underlying the Bivens regime—or at least derives no 
“special justification” from that error.274  
Returning to the two corollaries outlined above fleshes out why.275 First, 
a compensating adjustment is necessary only where there has been an irre-
versible departure from optimal constitutional design.276 From an anti-
Bivens perspective, the departure here is a separation-of-powers problem: in 
recognizing implied constitutional causes of action, courts allegedly invade 
Congress’s domain. Any such problem, however, does not arise in the § 1983 
context, and courts apply the same form of qualified immunity there. Of 
practical necessity, the range of a solution may sometimes exceed the range 
of the corresponding problem. This appears to be the case for both of the ex-
amples drawn from Vermeule’s work above. It would be difficult to limit the 
legislative veto to sweeping delegations for all of the reasons that the non-
delegation doctrine requires hard line-drawing decisions. And similar chal-
lenges would likely beset efforts to confine the line-item veto to omnibus 
legislation. But there are good reasons why the Harlow standard need not 
govern both Bivens actions and § 1983 suits.277 Consequently, even assuming 
that spillover effects are inevitable and therefore tolerable for some second-
 
 272. Vermeule, supra note 255, at 434. 
 273. Id. at 432. 
 274. Baude, supra note 3, at 68. 
 275. See supra notes 262–273 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra Section III.B.1. 
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best solutions (a question that deserves further academic attention), the pre-
sent situation is not necessarily one of them. 
Furthermore, overruling Bivens may be better than tolerating Harlow-
style qualified immunity. This is especially so because Congress could re-
spond by providing an express cause of action in Bivens’s place, thereby alle-
viating the separation-of-powers ailment allegedly afflicting the current 
system. 
Second, the best compensating adjustments respond to departures from 
optimal constitutional design in both scope and substance.278 Here again, the 
scope of Harlow’s separation-of-powers solution is overinclusive in the 
§ 1983 setting because there is no separation-of-powers problem to which 
qualified immunity could respond. And it may be overinclusive or underin-
clusive (or both) in the Bivens arena. One simply does not know and cannot 
realistically ascertain the number (or nature) of Bivens actions that Congress 
would want courts to eliminate through an immunity mechanism. 
More significantly, as for substance, the supposed solution fundamental-
ly fails to address—and instead arguably exacerbates—the purported prob-
lem. Just as one can believe that Congress rather than the judiciary should 
craft federal causes of action, one can believe that Congress rather than the 
judiciary should generally craft federal defenses (subject to the understand-
ing that statutory enactments incorporate common-law defenses absent con-
trary indications279). But as Pfander has observed, the Supreme Court’s 
repeated refusals to expand the Bivens regime through unilateral action con-
trast sharply with its “remarkable willingness to re-fashion the rules of quali-
fied immunity . . . without awaiting legislative guidance.”280 This creates a 
“juxtaposition” indicative of a “Janus-faced,” “on-again, off-again attitude 
toward the legitimacy of judge-made law.”281 
A comparative peek at two passages from Ziglar v. Abbasi illustrates this 
point. In addressing whether a Bivens action was available, the Court ex-
plained that separation-of-powers concerns mandate the careful considera-
tion of “ ‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages remedy, 
Congress or the courts?”282 The majority declared that “[t]he answer most 
often will be Congress.”283 In particular, the Court said, “[w]hen an issue ‘in-
volves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ it 
should be committed to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who 
 
 278. See supra notes 263–273 and accompanying text. 
 279. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079, 1099 (2017) (“Statutes of course trump unwritten rules, just as new statutes trump old 
ones. But an unwritten legal rule, like an old statute, governs of its own force until something 
else abrogates it. A common law duress defense might interrupt the operation of a criminal 
statute, even though the statute outranks the defense.”). 
 280. Pfander, supra note 138, at 1391. 
 281. Id. at 1391, 1405. 
 282. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 
380 (1983)). 
 283. Id. 
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interpret them.’ ”284 For “[i]t is not necessarily a judicial function to establish 
whole categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against per-
sonal liability claims in the complex sphere of litigation, with all of its bur-
dens on some and benefits to others.”285 In the Bivens context, the Court 
said, these burdens include both the monetary costs accompanying “defense 
and indemnification” and “the time and administrative costs attendant upon 
intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process.”286 
A few pages later, Abbasi addressed qualified immunity. There, the 
Court described how its own precedent “seeks a proper balance between two 
competing interests.”287 On the one hand, the Court remarked, “damages 
suits ‘may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional 
guarantees.’ ”288 But on the other, “permitting damages suits against gov-
ernment officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that 
fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhib-
it officials in the discharge of their duties.”289 Accordingly, Abbasi explained, 
“[a]s one means to accommodate these two objectives,” the Court has sought 
to “give[] officials ‘breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judg-
ments about open legal questions.’ ”290 
These passages are in some tension. The Court’s tone suggests, after all, 
that it is largely illegitimate for the judiciary to determine which claims 
should proceed based on competing cost considerations in the Bivens con-
text but perfectly fine for it to do the same thing in the qualified-immunity 
context.291 Perhaps the Court was only half-serious in saying that such issues 
“should be committed to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who 
interpret them’ ”?292 
In short, the two possible separation-of-powers wrongs represented by 
these passages do not make a constitutional right in the same manner as the 
compensating adjustments that Vermeule endorses. And that is so for rea-
sons similar to Baude’s argument for why qualified immunity represents a 
problematic response to Scalia’s criticism of the Monroe regime in Crawford-
El.293 Even if the doctrine addresses the scope of the departure from optimal 
 
 284. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)). 
 285. Id. at 1858. 
 286. Id. at 1856. 
 287. Id. at 1866. 
 288. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). 
 289. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). 
 290. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). 
 291. Perhaps one way to think about these two contexts is that they both pertain to “ben-
eficial powers” of the judiciary and should therefore stand or fall together. See Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 735, 743 (2001). 
 292. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 380 (1983)). 
 293. See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional design in a proportional way, which is far from clear, it fails to 
address the substance of the departure in a principled manner.294 
These impressions are all contestable. Thoroughgoing consequentialists 
could refuse to worry themselves with the means of undermining judges’ 
ability to recognize implied constitutional claims where the ends of qualified 
immunity accomplish this goal.295 But anti-Bivens individuals would seem 
more likely to subscribe to formalist modes of constitutional reasoning than 
pervasively consequentialist ones. Otherwise, they would be unlikely to em-
brace the relatively rigid separation-of-powers principles that lead many to 
reject the Bivens regime. Other skeptics might contend that three-plus dec-
ades of legislative silence in declining to supersede Harlow by statute demon-
strate approval of the decision.296 But inaction is a thin reed on which to rest 
a doctrine as momentous as qualified immunity. And numerous institutional 
forces combine to favor stasis over advance even in some instances where a 
majority of congresspeople would endorse a proposal in the abstract.297 On 
balance, therefore, the separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account 
advanced here appears to provide no persuasive argument for qualified im-
munity in the Bivens context (at least over and above any number of other 
ways that one could reduce the sum of such suits). 
B. The Federalism Line of Logic 
Now assume that a separation-of-powers rationale—or any other ra-
tionale, for that matter—justifies qualified immunity in the Bivens context. 
Would some principle of federalism then justify applying the Harlow stand-
 
 294. One could ask what an appropriate compensating adjustment might look like. To 
the extent that Bivens empowers courts at the expense of Congress, an ideal modification 
would involve empowering Congress at the expense of courts along some related line. Perhaps, 
for example, the legislature should be allowed to nullify the outcome of Bivens verdicts, contra 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), and possibly due-process principles. A less 
drastic maneuver (although arguably not a classical compensating adjustment) might involve 
conditioning the availability of Bivens actions on the absence of effective alternative congres-
sional remedies. As it happens, however, Bivens doctrine has long incorporated just such a 
principle (albeit not limited to congressional remedies), see Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858, which 
may simply show that Bivens has not taken the legal system as far afield from optimal constitu-
tional design as some suggest. The point is that variations like these, unlike the Harlow stand-
ard, would embody some attempt to respond to the substance, not just the scope, of 
separation-of-powers concerns with the Bivens regime. 
 295. See Baude, supra note 3, at 68 (suggesting that the power of Scalia’s Crawford-El dis-
sent “depends a lot on how brutal a compensating adjustment is allowed to be”). 
 296. See id. at 80 (suggesting the argument that “[b]ecause qualified immunity has been 
on the books for years and Congress has declined to revisit it, it may have obtained a belated 
Congressional imprimatur”). 
 297. There is a great deal of literature on this topic, of course. But Judge Easterbrook put 
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CHI. L. REV. 533, 538 (1983); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 
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ard in the § 1983 context, as the Supreme Court has suggested by repeatedly 
relying on the equivalence directive from Butz v. Economou? Three such 
theories bear considering: an equal-sovereignty principle arising from struc-
tural inferences, the incorporation doctrine arising from Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the congruence-and-proportionality concept 
arising from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1. Equal Sovereignty 
Equal sovereignty is a prominent yet provocative concept. The notion 
became notorious after the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County 
v. Holder,298 where Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion declared that 
“[n]ot only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also 
a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”299 Shelby 
County acknowledged that the concept first emerged in the context of “the 
admission of new States” into the Union.300 The Court insisted, however, 
that “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly perti-
nent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”301 Shelby County 
proceeded to invalidate an important provision of the Voting Rights Act that 
subjected different states to different standards.302 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent countered that beyond the admission context, 
equal sovereignty existed only as dicta in another opinion by Roberts,303 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder.304 Scholars 
tend to agree.305 Indeed, Shelby County “prompted savage criticism not only 
from the left, but also from the right.”306 
Shelby County’s arguable conception of equal sovereignty as presump-
tively proscribing disparate treatment among the states is controversial 
enough. No one appears to have endorsed a similar principle proscribing 
 
 298. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 299. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 544–57. 
 303. Id. at 587–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 304. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 305. See, e.g., Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes 
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 852–54 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion 
of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 732–33 (2014); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thom-
as P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. 
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disparate treatment between the states on the one hand and the federal gov-
ernment on the other. And the elemental structure of American govern-
ment—as reflected, for instance, in the text of the Supremacy Clause307—
would contradict any such contention. 
Some scholars, however, have offered a more nuanced theory of equal 
sovereignty. The key, they claim, is not equal treatment in all circumstances, 
but equal respect for basic sovereign prerogatives.308 Because the states re-
tained and the federal government received the fundamental attributes of 
sovereignty at the founding,309 this theory would seem to require a minimum 
measure of equality between the two levels of government. Accordingly, one 
could argue that the same standard for qualified immunity must govern both 
Bivens actions and § 1983 suits to the extent that constitutional-tort litiga-
tion would otherwise infringe basic sovereign prerogatives. 
But for at least two reasons, constitutional-tort actions against govern-
ment officials in their personal capacities do not appear to violate any such 
principles. First, important to arguments about state sovereignty is a theory 
about what the concept entails. Timothy Zick, for instance, invokes social-
construction theory to derive four “constitutive rules” of state sovereignty.310 
These include the “rule of preservation,” which protects the “necessary exist-
ence” of states within the constitutional system; the “rule of separateness,” 
which provides that states retain “exclusive control” over composing their 
governments; the “rule of participation,” which “preserves a substantial role 
for the states in national governance”; and the “rule of interpretive inde-
pendence,” which “provides that the states should generally be free to inter-
pret their own laws and constitutions.”311 
Zick notes that these rules define a baseline rather than the boundaries 
of state sovereignty.312 But there is little reason to think that § 1983 suits af-
front this or any other credible model of the concept. States have no legiti-
mate interests in allowing their officials to violate federal constitutional 
rights. And states are not required to satisfy § 1983 judgments from their 
public fiscs.313 Indeed, the idea that constitutional-tort litigation against gov-
 
 307. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
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ernment officials in their personal capacities offends state sovereignty would 
run counter to the tenet that such suits generally do not impose constitu-
tionally significant burdens on states qua states.314 Naturally, responding to 
§ 1983 suits against individual officers may effectively require states to ex-
pend resources (by, say, handling discovery requests). But courts do not gen-
erally consider indirect obligations in analogous contexts suspect.315 And the 
financial burden does not seem substantial enough to raise the kind of state-
sovereignty concerns that have caused the Supreme Court to condemn fed-
eral actions in other areas.316 
At bottom, the constitutional dimensions of § 1983 neither require nor 
forbid any “primary conduct” that the Bill of Rights, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not already regulate.317 So the notion that constitutional-
tort litigation against state officials infringes basic sovereign prerogatives 
would seem fairly far-fetched. 
The second reason that constitutional-tort actions against individual of-
ficials do not appear to disturb any basic sovereign prerogatives is that feder-
al authority may reach its zenith—and equal-sovereignty concerns, their 
nadir—when the government implements the Reconstruction Amend-
ments,318 as § 1983 does.319 To quote Thomas Colby: 
Reconstruction probably did not radically alter the basic architecture of 
federalism generally, including the inherent structural principle of equal 
state sovereignty, but it did bring about a sea change in the federal–state 
balance in one particular regard: the ability of the federal government to 
protect the fundamental rights of the people from state infringement.320 
Put simply, “the history supports a claim that Congress should be afforded 
greater leeway to bend the equal sovereignty principle when it is acting pur-
suant to its Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers.”321 Thus, the civil-rights setting may make it permissible for quali-
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fied immunity to overstep any otherwise applicable equal-sovereignty prin-
ciple. 
All in all, no one seems to have proposed that an equal-sovereignty prin-
ciple governs the relationship between the states and the federal government; 
any equal-treatment version appears groundless; any sovereign-prerogatives 
version appears inapposite given the limited impact of personal-capacity 
constitutional-tort suits on states qua states; and § 1983’s foundation in the 
Fourteenth Amendment renders the appeal of any such principle especially 
tenuous in the present context. 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Contemplating the Fourteenth Amendment calls to mind two more po-
tential bases for the equivalence directive, the first sounding in Section 1 and 
the second, in Section 5. 
The Supreme Court has concluded that Section 1’s Due Process 
Clause322 incorporates at least most of the Bill of Rights against the states.323 
Early cases adopted a model where “even when a right set out in the Bill of 
Rights was held to fall within the conception of due process, the protection 
or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from the 
protection or remedies provided against abridgement by the Federal Gov-
ernment.”324 The Court later “abandoned” this model as “ ‘incongruous,’ ” 
holding that “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced 
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same 
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroach-
ment.’ ”325 But Justice Powell resisted this move, arguing that the Court 
should continue to distinguish between the content of the Bill of Rights and 
the content of due process.326 Holding states to the same standards as the 
federal government, he said, “derogates principles of federalism that are 
basic to our system,” particularly the principle of allowing the states “free-
dom to experiment” with policies “different from the federal model.”327 
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The question whether the Harlow standard should govern § 1983 suits 
does not concern incorporation, of course. But it does concern whether “in-
corporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States 
under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that 
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’ ”328 And it also 
concerns the extent to which states enjoy the “freedom to experiment” with 
policies “different from the federal model.”329 Consequently, one could view 
the equivalence directive as an analogical compromise between the majori-
ty’s position and Powell’s position on the incorporation issue. 
One could also look to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment330 to 
support employing the equivalence directive in the Harlow context. In 1997, 
the Supreme Court described the contours of Congress’s power under this 
provision in City of Boerne v. Flores,331 which invalidated the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied against the states. RFRA had rein-
stated the framework that governed the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause before the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.332 For 
Congress to legislate under Section 5, Flores said, “[t]here must be a congru-
ence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”333 RFRA, the Court held, ran afoul of 
this rule because it was substantive, not prophylactic or remedial, in na-
ture.334 This, the Court said, constituted “a considerable congressional intru-
sion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate 
for the health and welfare of their citizens.”335 
What does Flores have to do with Harlow? Although Harlow was for-
mally a remedial decision, one could characterize it as functionally restrict-
ing the substance of individual rights in the context of damages suits against 
federal officials. Indeed, it is not unusual for scholars to do so.336 Under this 
view, someone could argue that § 1983 could not call for enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment more strictly against state officials than Harlow calls for 
enforcing individual rights against federal officials without transgressing the 
congruence-and-proportionality concept (or an anticipatory variant of the 
concept, since Harlow predates Flores). Put differently, § 1983 arguably rep-
resents an appropriate remedial measure under the federalism principles 
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priate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 331. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 332. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see Flores, 521 U.S. at 512. 
 333. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 334. Id. at 529–36. 
 335. Id. at 534. 
 336. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 72, at 485 (“[O]fficial immunity doctrines perform an 
equilibrating function by diminishing the social costs that constitutional rights would have if 
officers who violated them were always strictly liable in suits for damages.”). 
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embodied in Section 5 only if it includes the defense of Harlow-style quali-
fied immunity. The protection afforded by that standard, after all, sets the 
lowest common denominator between the schemes for holding federal offi-
cials versus state officials accountable in damages for constitutional viola-
tions. 
These potential justifications for expanding the Harlow standard into 
the § 1983 sphere may seem promising, but for several reasons, neither suc-
ceeds. To start, the Supreme Court does not appear to have drawn any con-
nection between the scope of the Harlow standard and Section 1 or 5. So the 
intent underlying the expansion likely had nothing to do with avoiding 
problems under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In addition, any principle that arises from Section 1 or 5 ought to govern 
all matters implicating those provisions. At a minimum, this set includes all 
§ 1983 claims involving the Bill of Rights (for Section 1 undergirds the gen-
eral ability to enforce such rights against the states,337 and Section 5 under-
girds the specific ability to do so through a congressionally created cause of 
action338). But qualified immunity applies only to claims for damages against 
executive officials involving discretionary conduct.339 It does not apply, for 
instance, to claims for injunctive relief,340 claims against municipal enti-
ties,341 or claims involving nondiscretionary behavior.342 If some model of 
qualified immunity represented a constitutional minimum required by Sec-
tion 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it should reach those kinds of 
claims under § 1983 as well. Although this point does not directly address 
whether the qualified-immunity standards applicable to state and federal de-
fendants must match one another, it provides a powerful argument against 
locating any such imperative in Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Setting the functionalist perspective momentarily aside, there is little 
reason to think that § 1983 operates as a backdoor for dictating the content 
of constitutional rights. Section 1983 is far more plainly remedial than RFRA 
was,343 simply making a cause of action available for certain independent 
wrongs.344 To quote the Supreme Court, although reasonable minds could 
“disagree[] regarding the scope of Congress’s ‘prophylactic’ enforcement 
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powers” under Section 5, “no one doubts” that Section 5 “grants Congress 
the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amendment by creating pri-
vate remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.”345 
In any event, to say that Harlow functionally restricted the substance of 
individual rights may conflate rights and remedies in a fashion antithetical to 
Flores itself, which maintained a “decisive distinction” between the two.346 
Or, paradoxically, if the functionalist literature is correct that rights and 
remedies are ontologically inseparable ideas,347 the congruence-and-
proportionality concept is problematic in the first place. Levinson, for in-
stance, argues that “the question of whether prophylactic rules are really 
remedies or really redefinitions of rights” is “empty and indeterminate.”348 
For “[i]f the very same prophylactic rules . . . may either be built into the def-
initions of rights or stand apart as remedies, nothing about the nature of any 
given prophylactic rule will reveal whether it is ‘really’ a remedy or a 
right.”349 
Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment offer plausible theoreti-
cal hooks for the otherwise amorphous inkling that federalism principles re-
quire courts to apply equivalent qualified-immunity standards to state and 
federal officials. But neither provision ultimately justifies that notion. 
3. Freestanding Federalism 
A proponent of the present qualified-immunity model could try to sal-
vage the federalism rationale for applying the Harlow standard in the § 1983 
setting by attempting to invoke a general norm of federal–state parallelism in 
constitutional enforcement. 
As an initial matter, one could respond by arguing that such a norm is 
by no means universal. There is a substantial disparity between the frame-
works for enforcing constitutional rights against federal and state officials, 
for instance, in the sense that the range of rights that a plaintiff can vindicate 
through a Bivens action is far narrower than the range of rights that a plain-
tiff can vindicate through a § 1983 suit. 
Furthermore, some of the most prominent examples of federal–state 
parallelism are distinguishable. Brown v. Board of Education350 prohibited 
racial segregation in public schools. Brown’s holding, however, applied only 
to states because it arose from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause. In Bolling v. Sharpe,351 issued the same day as Brown, the Su-
preme Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required 
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the same result for Washington, D.C. The Court stated that “[i]n view of our 
decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitu-
tion would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”352 But the ac-
tual basis for the decision was a discrete due-process rule. Segregation in 
public schools, the Court held, was “not reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective” and thus arbitrarily deprived black students of lib-
erty.353 
As another example, Hurd v. Hodge354 held that federal courts could not 
enforce racially restrictive covenants, just as Shelley v. Kraemer355 had held 
for state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
In Hurd, the Court stated that “[w]e cannot presume that the public policy of 
the United States manifests a lesser concern for the protection of such basic 
rights against discriminatory action of federal courts than against such ac-
tion taken by the courts of the States.”356 But the actual basis for the decision 
was a federal statute and, in the alternative, a contract-law doctrine.357 Of the 
latter, the Court said, “[t]he power of the federal courts to enforce the terms 
of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and 
limitations of the public policy of the United States.”358 
Accordingly, in both cases, the Court grounded its reasoning in particu-
lar legal principles, not in (or at least in addition to) general concerns about 
federal–state parallelism.359 Issues of parallelism in constitutional enforce-
ment warrant further attention. At bottom, however, attempting to justify 
expanding the Harlow standard into the § 1983 setting on these grounds ap-
pears to represent an appeal to what John Manning has termed “freestanding 
federalism.”360 
The Constitution, Manning contends, “defines ‘federalism’ only through 
its adoption of a number of particular measures that collectively reflect the 
background aim of establishing a federal system.”361 Thus, he argues, 
“[t]reating that background aim as a freestanding legal norm devalues the 
choice to bargain over, settle upon, and present to the ratifying conventions 
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a cluster of relatively, even if imperfectly, specified means to achieve that 
aim.”362 One way to understand Manning’s point is that one cannot properly 
conjure legal doctrine out of mere intuitions about the way that federalism 
should operate in the constitutional system.363 But that seems to be just what 
the federalism aspect of the structural account advanced here entails. 
In sum, neither equal sovereignty nor incorporation nor congruence 
and proportionality can justify employing the equivalence directive to apply 
the Harlow standard to § 1983 suits. Instead, inappropriate notions of free-
standing federalism appear to lie at the heart of such reasoning. The federal-
ism aspect of the structural account advanced here thus fails to justify the 
current qualified-immunity regime. 
Two additional points that support the same conclusion bear mention-
ing. First, the particular details of the previous discussion should not obscure 
the general nature of the predicament. Congress provided an express damag-
es action against state officials, but not federal officials, for violating consti-
tutional rights. There are good reasons to think that the absence of a 
statutory cause of action encouraged the Supreme Court to apply an espe-
cially protective qualified-immunity standard to federal officials. If that is 
correct, the Court’s subsequent decision to extend the same standard to state 
officials at least arguably constricted congressionally enacted text to conform 
to federal common law, which seems exactly backward. 
Second, the very viability of the equivalence directive depends on Har-
low’s legitimacy in the Bivens environment. If qualified immunity is improp-
er in Bivens actions, others have identified good reasons why the doctrine 
should not survive for § 1983 suits either.364 Given the many grounds for 
skepticism on the Bivens front, the validity of the Harlow standard in the 
§ 1983 domain seems all the more doubtful. 
C. Three Upshots 
The above discussion addresses the doctrine’s roots in constitutional 
structure, but what are the upshots for the propriety of qualified immunity 
more generally? Several answers come to mind, but an initial note may prove 
helpful.  
As explained above, the justices have offered various rationales for the 
Supreme Court’s muscular conception of qualified immunity, and previous 
scholarship has rebutted these rationales along multiple compelling, but not 
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universally convincing, lines. The present project offers an account of the 
Court’s course grounded in structural constitutional concerns. But it bears 
emphasizing that the justices’ own accounts and the structural account ad-
vanced here do not cover the waterfront of possible explanations and poten-
tial justifications for the doctrine’s development. Other scholars have 
identified additional considerations that played and may continue to play a 
part in producing and supporting qualified immunity.365 And still more 
scholars will identify still more considerations, both descriptive and norma-
tive. In short, the rise of the current qualified-immunity regime is susceptible 
of multiple coincident accounts—and even multiple structural accounts.366 
That said, the primary answer to the upshots question is that rejecting 
Harlow-style qualified immunity would seem well warranted. The present 
analysis has attempted to offer a more accurate and attractive account of the 
defense than an exclusive focus on the justices’ explicit rationales provides. 
But an adequate justification remains elusive. It is notoriously difficult to 
prove a negative—in this case, that no possible basis provides sufficient sup-
port for the current qualified-immunity regime. But the burden of persua-
sion as to the doctrine’s propriety should rest on its proponents, and even 
over thirty years after Harlow came down, they have not yet carried the 
weight. 
A secondary answer is that someone could reject the Harlow standard in 
part, seeing qualified immunity as illegitimate in suits against state defend-
ants but legitimate in suits against federal defendants. The present analysis 
argues that the doctrine rests on different foundations in the § 1983 and 
Bivens contexts. And that means that qualified immunity should be more 
difficult to justify for state officials than federal officials, at least insofar as 
the statutory setting of § 1983 constrains the range of available defenses 
more than the federal-common-law milieu of Bivens does. So someone could 
agree with the analysis here but accept qualified immunity in the Bivens do-
main because the possible assessments of the policy contentions for and 
against the doctrine are almost endless. These contentions, after all, concern 
values that are not only arguably incommensurable, but also to which people 
can reasonably attach different weights—for instance, providing full vindica-
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tion to victims of governmental mistreatment on the one hand versus pre-
venting overdeterrence of and unfairness to executive officials on the other. 
A tertiary answer is that someone could see qualified immunity as legit-
imate in both suits against state officials and suits against federal officials de-
spite crediting that the doctrine should be evaluated differently in these 
distinct areas. To do so in a manner consistent with the contentions offered 
here, however, would require rejecting either the view that the statutory set-
ting of § 1983 substantially constrains the range of available defenses or the 
work of Baude and others who have argued against the justices’ own ac-
counts of qualified immunity as rooted in positive law.367 Or it would require 
pointing to some other justification for qualified immunity in the § 1983 
context.  
To be clear, Baude’s argument is not that § 1983 “permits absolutely no 
immunities at all because the text is categorical on its face.”368 Indeed, Baude 
recognizes that “[u]nwritten defenses are not unknown to the law.”369 And 
scholars like Caleb Nelson have recently suggested more sophisticated un-
derstandings of federal common law than many skeptics previously pro-
pounded.370 Baude’s argument, instead, is that “[t]he real problem with 
qualified immunity is that it is so far removed from ordinary principles of 
legal interpretation.”371 Accordingly, Baude contends that “[e]xposing the 
Court’s choices lets us make a clearer and more responsible decision about 
whether those choices are the rights ones or whether, having given us such a 
categorical immunity doctrine, the Court should now take some of it 
back.”372  
The possibility of abandoning the Harlow standard naturally leads to 
questions about stare decisis. Harlow’s status as Supreme Court precedent 
merits respect. Stare decisis, however, “is not an inexorable command,” as 
the Court has made especially clear in the qualified-immunity context.373 
And inquiring into the justifiability of qualified immunity as a matter of first 
principles is important in any event. There is inherent value in understand-
ing whether the Court has been right or wrong to embrace an immunity 
standard with the apparent effect of denying monetary redress—and in 
many cases, any redress—to large numbers of people who have suffered con-
stitutional violations. And Harlow’s legitimacy bears on whether and to what 
extent the Court should extend or overrule subsidiary aspects of qualified-
immunity doctrine as well. 
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Furthermore, and fortunately, others have begun drilling down on sig-
nificant issues concerning the doctrine’s future. These issues include not on-
ly the effects of stare decisis,374 but also which institution, the Court or 
Congress, is better situated to modify qualified immunity,375 as well as what 
more rights-protective amendments short of completely eliminating the de-
fense might look like.376 
It is worth noting, however, that there are good reasons to think that 
completely eliminating qualified immunity would not cause the sky to fall. 
Setting aside qualified immunity would simply mean that executive officials 
would face the same litigation landscape that private defendants face. And 
the law does a great deal to protect private defendants from meritless suits—
especially through pleading and summary-judgment standards that are more 
difficult for plaintiffs to overcome now than when Harlow was decided.377 
CONCLUSION 
Qualified immunity is under attack. Stakeholders ranging from the 
NAACP to the Cato Institute have advocated its reconsideration. But the Su-
preme Court persists in employing and even extending the doctrine. Per-
haps, therefore, the governing Harlow standard rests on something more 
than the policy and positive-law rationales on which previous criticisms have 
focused. 
Indeed, the Harlow standard emerged in the Bivens context, and that 
provenance points toward an account of the doctrine that sounds in consti-
tutional structure and resonates throughout the relevant jurisprudence. One 
aspect involves separation of powers: that Harlow righted the Bivens regime’s 
alleged wrongs by cutting back on a cause of action that had expanded judi-
cial power and had contracted an arguably exclusive congressional preroga-
tive. The other aspect involves federalism: that equivalent standards must 
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govern in the Bivens and § 1983 contexts to avoid holding state officials to 
stricter constitutional rules than their federal counterparts face. 
This structural account is important on a descriptive level. But it cannot 
sustain qualified immunity as a normative matter. With respect to the sepa-
ration-of-powers aspect, a compensating-adjustments framework provides 
an apt mode of analysis. For those who support the Bivens regime, there is 
unlikely to be a sufficient departure from optimal constitutional design for 
qualified immunity to offset. And for those who oppose the Bivens regime, 
qualified immunity should represent a problematic response in both scope 
and substance. The theory underlying the federalism aspect of the structural 
account is unclear, and more work remains on questions concerning feder-
al–state parallelism in constitutional enforcement. But to the extent that 
support could come from an equal-sovereignty principle, the incorporation 
doctrine, or the congruence-and-proportionality concept, the equivalence 
directive as applied in Harlow and its progeny stretches each area beyond 
recognition. The directive thus appears to turn on a notion of freestanding 
federalism that is too far removed from the actual constitutional design. 
At bottom, the structural account advanced here cannot rescue the Har-
low standard for qualified immunity from the cloud of suspicion that previ-
ous criticisms have created. And the dangers of denying what often 
embodies the only possible remedy for constitutional violations are too sub-
stantial to rest on a doctrine that lacks legitimacy. There are good reasons to 
conclude, therefore, that proponents of the defense, including the Supreme 
Court itself, have failed to make their case—and that the legal community 
should significantly restrain or simply reject qualified immunity. 
  
